Institute of Biblical Defense

by Paul Pardi, IBD Faculty and Speaker, Secretary-Treasurer of the Evangelical Philosophical Society and member of the American Philosophical Association and Society of Christian Philosophers

Much has been written in recent years on the topic of faith and reason. In most of these works one will find a clear dichotomy between epistemology in general and religious epistemology. Much of the time one is reading a defense of the rationality of religious knowledge vis-à-vis a developed, broader system of epistemology. In this post-enlightenment age, rarely will one find an epistemology that presents the act of knowledge in a context of pre-established theism (or Christian theism) where theism serves as the ground for all knowledge whatever.

Perhaps rightly so. For in discussions of religious epistemology, it is not knowledge of the world one is seeking to establish (that is usually a given and specific claims to knowledge of objects of the world tend to be used as a clear cases of knowledge) but rather it is claims to knowledge of the objects of religion that are under scrutiny. Most of us have little problem with reason. Rather it is faith we are seeking to bolster and show that it is indeed reasonable. What would be the epistemological advantage of showing reason to be faithful? However, could such an approach be developed where a system of knowledge was developed out of Christian philosophy of the world? Would such an approach solve any problems that plague theories of knowledge (and solve more problems than it creates)? This paper will take up those two questions and look at an attempt to answer them.[1]

As stated above, in more recent discussions of Christian epistemology, reason is set up as the standard against which the claims of theism are judged. In a later chapter in Philosophy of Religion entitled “Faith and Reason”, William Rowe writes, “The central question that has occupied our attention since the first chapter is whether there are rational grounds supporting the basic claims of theistic religions.”[2] Similarly Geivett and Sweetman note, “The question of whether or not it is rational to believe in the existence of God is one of the most important of all human concerns. . . . However, it has proved difficult to decide the issue of the rationality of belief in God, and philosophers have debated it from the beginning of time without producing any clear-cut or decisive solution which has come to be generally accepted.”[3] In chapter one of his Reasonable Faith, William Lane Craig states, “Before presenting a case for Christianity, we must come to grips with some very fundamental questions about the nature and relationship of faith and reason. Exactly how do we know Christianity is true?”[4]

The view towards faith and reason represented by these statements is one of the reasons, I believe, why modern theistic philosophy has seen such a boon in apologetics—the discipline of “defending the faith.”[5] Defending it against what? Against the inroads of modern, post-enlightenment “reason”, upon the modern Weltanschauung. Certainly this is a noble and necessary endeavor.

What options have theistic philosophers taken in developing this defense? There seems to be two approaches that have been traversed in modern history. The first is to accept the enlightenment view of rationality (at least in a broad sense) and try to demonstrate that Christianity is rational on these grounds. This approach falls under the rubric of what many have called the Thomistic approach to apologetics.[6] It also has been characterized under the broader category of natural theology (or natural theologizing if one wishes to see it as applying the principles of a natural theology). The other, under the general aegis of Reformed thought, has sought to broaden the boundaries of what it means to be rational and in so doing demonstrate that analysis of belief in God may actually aid in defining what rationality is.[7]

The latter approach has been viewed by many academics as more auspicious and is gaining a wider and wider hearing among Christian thinkers. Even so, Reformed epistemologists are not trying to redefine the classical view of what is deemed as rational, but are trying to broaden what might be included within that idea. Certainly this is the view of Mark McLeod in his book Rationality and Theistic Belief. He evaluates the epistemologies of Plantinga and Alston characterizing their basic premises essentially as parity theses. By this he means to say that both Plantinga and Alston are attempting to explain the rationality of theistic belief by arguing “that certain beliefs about God are just as rational as beliefs about perceived physical objects.” [8] If McLeod is right, then these Reformed epistemologists see perception (or some phenomenological analogue) as paradigmatic of rational belief against which religious belief can be compared and, finally, to which it can be equated.

Though McLeod rejects these Reformed approaches he does not reject the idea of grounding the rationality of theism via parity with non-religious modes of belief formation. For after thoroughly examining and criticizing Plantinga and Alston, McLeod develops his own “New Parity Thesis” (which is an amalgam of Reidian epistemology and holistic coherentism) and argues that religious belief is justified in the same way as beliefs about persons as unique individuals. What is noteworthy about McLeod’s characterization of Plantinga and Alston, and McLeod’s own position is that the rationality of religious belief is being formulated in terms of some other generally accepted rational belief (or mode of belief formation) and not vice versa. It may not be natural theology pure and simple but it is certainly a not too distant relative.

There is a third option, however, that is available to the theist. This third approach attempts to tear down the enlightenment view of reason altogether and erect in its place an approach to reason that places knowledge of God and His word at its center. This view has come largely out of the Dutch Reformed[9] churches developing from the thought of Abraham Kuyper (though its proponents argue that it had a much earlier origin[10]). This approach has had a much narrower hearing in the Christian academic community due to (I believe) its lack of systemization and its decidedly apologetic approach. It does however represent what I believe to be a largely clandestine view in many conservative evangelical churches and seminaries and represents the most developed view of an approach to a thoroughly Christianized epistemology qua Christian epistemology as I will define it.

Perhaps the question of an exhaustive epistemology based on religious constraints is actually penultimate. The prior question may have to do with the extensibility of religion as a comprehensive philosophy of the world and life. If it is so extensible the idea of a thoroughly religious epistemology isn’t so far off. Opinions vary as to the intellectual viability of such a project. Some see the task being hindered by enlightenment thought and if we can shed our enlightenment fetters, the doors are open for a comprehensive philosophy based in religion (the way it used to be). For instance Evans and Westphal write, “Maybe religious knowledge looks dubious because we have the wrong idea about what it is to know something and how we know what we know. In the last thirty years there has been a marked resurgence of Christian Philosophy, and this suspicion has developed into a full-fledged assault on Enlightenment epistemologies and those philosophies of religion which rests on them.”[11] Even though they appear to be open to the idea of a “new Christian view of the world,” the bifurcation between religious and non-religious epistemology is clearly present throughout the papers in their book.

In evaluating the Reformed answer to the epistemological question, Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger draw some observations about the viability of what they call a “common philosophical rationality” based on religion. “It does seem that in deciding [whether religious experience grounds religious belief], an important role is played by one’s willingness (or unwillingness, as the case may be) to give up the goal of a ‘universal method’ for reaching philosophical agreement and to accept that the different starting points and belief-commitments of philosophers may give rise to disagreements that are not decidable by means of a common philosophical rationality.”[12] They go on to conclude that the prospects for a religious epistemology whose application goes beyond the objects of religion alone are probably rather nil.

It appears that religious epistemologies are developed in order to vouchsafe specific religious truth claims. However it seems to me that the development of broader epistemologies that begin with Christianity as a philosophical foundation is motivated by other concerns as well. As mentioned above, a Christianized epistemology may serve as an heuristic for general epistemological problems vouchsafing not only religious beliefs but any beliefs whatever. Further, there may be theological motivations . One may, for instance, wish to preserve the absolute sovereignty of God by completely removing man from the act of knowing. [13] This might best be done in an epistemological system that is driven either by God’s nature or His will.

There is an important distinction between evaluating knowledge claims (which would be normative epistemology) and evaluating systems that evaluate knowledge claims (what we might call meta-epistemology). This paper is engaging in the latter type of evaluation and will seek to determine the viability of a system of epistemology. In order to evaluate whether or not a Christianized epistemology solves any of the problems that plague attempts to develop a comprehensive theory of knowledge, the problems themselves must be defined. What an adequate epistemology must do is a difficult question in and of itself.[14]

What would a Christian epistemology look like? Obviously such an approach would have to be theistic. It would have to explain both events of belief formation and doxastic justification in terms of an ontology of knowledge that includes an explanation of the noetic relation between mind and world in terms of the creative act of God. Also it would have to include Christian revelation within the scheme. The latter is important for a Christian epistemology, as it is revelation that distinguishes a general theism from Christian theism.

Specifically, I believe a fully christianized epistemology might have the following features. (1) It would explicate the justification (on the standard JTB account) conditions for all knowledge whatever. That is, its range of discussion will not be limited to religious knowledge alone.[15] (2) The justification conditions for knowledge would include an act of God that causes a given belief to come to be known. I will not specify at this point whether the causal relation needs to be efficient or final. However a fundamental tenet of Christianity is that God is not creator only but sustainer as well.[16] (3) Christian revelation somehow would serve as a standard by which the truth-value for all belief is measured. (4) Full or complete justification of beliefs (knowledge) would be attainable only by those who stand in some personal relationship with God.[17]

These features are derived in part from the Christian belief that not only did God create man,[18] but He did so with the capacity to know Him. That is, man was created with a specific teleology: to enter into a personal relationship with God. Further, such a capacity, when not exercised leaves man incomplete.[19] A Christian epistemology then might include this noetic capacity insofar as it seeks to explain the conditions under which knowledge is possible.

This precisely is the project of Cornelius Van Til. Instead of asking what one can know about religious matters based upon a non-religious view of knowledge, he asks what one can know of the world based on certain “religious” truths. The rest of this paper will examine Van Til’s approach to this question. One may ask, “Why Van Til?” I have chosen Van Til not because I believe his position to be the most clearly defined and presented, nor even because I hold him to be the most adequate representative of this particular position (in fact I lean the other way on both accounts). I have chosen to examine his view for the following three reasons.

First Van Til’s epistemology represents what I believe to be the approach taken by many in (especially) conservative Christian churches at least in the west. The Christian scripture is the epistemological starting point of faith for many believers though most churchgoers do not usually understand the importance of that. Second, though Van Til’s writings are not popular outside of certain Reformed circles, he has had considerable influence on the evangelical church at large through his students, most notably Francis Schaeffer and Greg Bahnsen. Third, Van Til, has done specific work in the area of epistemology relating to theistic belief as an epistemologist and more importantly believed that the appeal to scripture was not only important for religious knowledge but for all knowledge. This relates directly to the project at hand.

Essential Van Til

My analysis of Van Til will be an attempt to draw out key characteristics of his view of knowledge as it might apply to a thoroughly Christian philosophy of the world. I cannot, in this short paper, hope to answer objections to his position (nor would I be qualified to do so). I can, however, attempt to build a framework that is representative of the key ideas of Van Til. My hope is that in constructing this framework I will be to provide enough insight into this view such that its viability (and potential for further development) can be fully appreciated.

As a starting point, I will lay out what I see as essential ideas in Van Til’s approach. Let F stand for any fact whatever. Let B stand for the self-attesting Christian revelation or Scripture. If we assert also that for any F,

(1) F sustains a relation R to B such that B interprets F

then S knows F just in case

(2) S believes F

(3) S presupposes God’s existence

(4) S stands in some relation R*­ to R such that R completes F for S.

These four propositions capture the essence, I think, of Van Til’s epistemology. As mentioned earlier, his approach uses the language of metaphysics but he attempts to draw epistemological conclusions. Can the system based on these propositions form an adequate basis for understanding what knowledge is? To answer this we will have to carefully examine each of the above propositions then look at how they relate to one another to form Van Til’s approach to Christian epistemology.

Before examining the propositions, a word must be said about how this analysis relates to what is going on in epistemology as a discipline. Much of contemporary epistemology is concerned with addressing the ambiguity that exists regarding the third condition of the standard, tripartite view of knowledge. Namely, epistemologists are seeking to provide insight into that feature that turns true belief into knowledge. Historically, the study has concentrated on the justification condition though of late some epistemologists have replace justification with some other condition. In any case, examining that feature (whatever it is) will be important in our study of Van Til. More specifically, we will have to surface from Van Til’s view that feature (or those features) that justifies or warrants Christian belief.[20]

There are a couple of features that can be surfaced immediately about the set of propositions I have laid out. The first is that knowledge on this view is structured in terms of entities and relations that obtain between them. That is, when certain relations obtain between a person and some object, the person knows that object. Second this system relies heavily on Christian revelation. This is important to notice for our present purpose, as it is the Bible (insofar as it the logos of Christ) that defines Christianity qua Christianity. If Van Til’s system did not include the Bible in a fundamental way, it would be questionable whether or not it could be called a Christian epistemology. Third the set attempts to define all knowledge, not just “religious knowledge.” In fact, Van Til held that knowledge of anything in the world had to be understood in terms of Christian theism. For him, the claims of Christianity were “truer” than anything else one could know and so in some sense grounds all knowledge. Because of this, knowledge of the world could be defined only in terms of Christian theism. The following will examine the set of propositions in light of these considerations.

Presuppositions

Van Til’s system has been called presuppositional. If that label is accurate (and I believe it is) one would expect presuppositions to be at the core of his system and (3) satisfies this expectation. Van Til’s use and meaning of the term “presupposition” is somewhat varied.[21] Essentially, the notion of presuppositions appear to include both a cognitive element—an entity of some sort which is the direct object[22] of some noetic function—and a relational element.[23] I think, then, presuppositions can best be understood in terms of objects and relations. Each of these must be taken in turn.

Taking the former idea first, the objects of knowledge for Van Til are facts. Relating this to the concept of presuppositions, Van Til develops the idea that there is a fact (or are facts) upon which all other facts depend for their existence. For Van Til this has ontological as well as epistemological implications. Ontologically this means that certain facts cannot exist independently but are dependent upon other facts for their existence (ostensibly this would include their coming to be and their continuing to be). More to the point, Van Til believes that no fact can exist unless the fact stands in an ontological dependency relation to a single fact: the fact that God exists (F_G).[24] This latter fact however does not stand in a dependency relation to anything else. To use modal language, God’s existence is a necessary fact without which any other fact could exist. This ontological map is implied (if not explicitly stated) in Van Til’s use of presuppositions.[25]

Facts

To understand this better, we must digress and look briefly at how the notion of facts function within Van Til’s epistemological system. Since facts are the objects of knowledge then when a subject knows (or believes) a thing it is a fact that he knows. Although a systematic presentation of the nature of facts is hard to find in Van Til, they appear to have the following features: (a) they are extra-mental entities, (b) they are not propositional in nature,[26] (c) they can be apprehended by the mind, (d) they must be interpreted to be known, (e) facts, in some sense, just are objects and states of affairs (O/SA) and are not to be distinguished from them.[27] Essentially facts appear to be the objects and states of affairs that make up the world. All physical objects are facts as are states of affairs and metaphysical objects.

This description, however, does not really explain matters. The problem arises in the way Van Til employs the use of facts in his system. Facts appear to have properties that would differentiate them from objects and states of affairs (and vice versa). For example, (d) indicates that facts are apprehended by the mind meaning that facts are the objects of comprehension. But certainly when one comprehends the existence of a tree, one does not have a physical tree in one’s mind (imagine the headache that would cause!). Yet Van Til wants to avoid saying that a fact is a proposition or some other entity of that sort. Given this, the best I can say is that facts appear to be some property or properties of objects and states of affairs that relate to the mind in some way. Thus facts are not separated ontologically from these entities yet they do not necessarily encompass every property of these entities. This ultimately may be an inaccurate rendering of Van Til’s idea but will have to suffice as a working definition for our purposes.

To round out this ontological picuture, Van Til holds that God created man with the capacity to know the world around him and he created the world with properties such that man’s noetic structure is able to cognitively “fit” with those properties.[28] He writes, “God has created the human mind. In this human mind God has laid the laws of thought according to which it is to operate. In the facts of science God has laid the laws of being according to which they function. In other words the impress of God’s plan is upon his whole creation.”[29] God’s design of both the human mind and the world allows for the possibility of knowledge. Further, God must aid in interpreting what man apprehends through this mind-world interaction. “If the Christian position with respect to creation, that is, with respect to the idea of both the subject and the object of human knowledge is true, there is and must be objective knowledge. In that case the world of objects was made in order that the subject of knowledge, namely man, should interpret it under God.”[30]

Facts and Interpretation

This statement by Van Til brings to the surface another very important aspect about facts: facts must be interpreted to be known. This is the relational side of presuppositions. That is, facts are not “brute” but stand in relations to other facts and stand in ultimate relations to the plan of God. If one attempts to know facts apart from these relations, she is attempting to do the impossible.[31] There are no non-interpreted facts of science for example. Every thing that science discovers as a fact relates in some way both to the other facts of the world and to the plan of God. To know these facts truly, these relations must be a part of the epistemic process.

To reiterate, the human mind has functions and properties that allow man to know in this way. For Van Til, this cognitive fit is part and parcel of the human design. With this, Van Til’s approach avoids (at least on the surface) much of the sticky epistemological problems that plague many systems (such as objectively validating the correspondence relation between thought and world). If this relation is built into the cognitive structure of humans and God created the world with properties that immediately “interface” with that structure, the need for sense datum or idealist theories is done away. With this background, (3) can be modified as follows,

(3¢) S presupposes God’s existence when S stands in some relation R* to F_G.

A presupposition then includes a fact (I might add of a certain class) and the relation one sustains to that fact. As Frame points out, a helpful analog to this idea is the notion of a priori knowledge where the latter consists of knowledge that is not experientially based. Van Til’s notion of presuppositions takes this idea much further. For him, presuppositions are necessary for any sort of knowledge whatever. Beyond this, the relation between subject and this presupposition does in fact obtain for all persons.[32] Without this relation no one could know[33] anything. Again the presupposition to which all subjects must necessarily be related is the fact of God’s existence. We now must explore this relation a bit further.

The Presupposition Relation

The first condition for knowledge, then, is that the subject presupposes the existence of God in terms of the relations described above. However, the epistemological significance of this relation has not been addressed. It seems at least prima facie false to say, for instance, that a person cannot know that Mount Rainier exists unless that person first believes the presupposition that God exists. Further, it is not at all clear what kind of a relation R* is. In order to address these problems, it will be necessary to introduce some key terms and distinctions that Van Til employs.

Denotation and Connotation

Van Til makes a critical distinction between the denotation and the connotation of a fact. Crudely, the denotation of a fact is its “thatness” and the connotation of a fact is its “whatness.”[34] These two terms specify the range of the relation that obtains between fact and subject. More specifically they designate the degree to which a subject is related to the object of knowledge. The denotation of a fact is, simply, the finite existence of that fact as it is grasped by the subject. What is denoted by a fact is nothing more than the prima facie properties and relations that can be predicated of the fact itself. It may be accurate to say that the denotation of a fact is those features that can be pre-reflectively apprehended of it. To say that the cat is on the mat is to say nothing more than that a cat exists, a mat exists and that the cat stands in an on top of relation to the mat. However there are much more to facts than mere denotation. Van Til brings out these further features in his idea of connotation.

The connotation of a fact is all that is entailed by a comprehensive predication of that fact. This involves understanding all the facts that can be predicated of that initial fact. The cat, for instance, not only exists, but it is a living thing, it has x number of physical properties, it is of such and such a breed, it didn’t come into existence yesterday, etc. There may be innumerable other facts that can be predicated of any given fact. The point is that what is connoted by a fact includes every other fact that can be predicated of that fact.

In employing the concept of connotation, Van Til seems to emphasize the idea of implication not fullness. What I mean by this is that Van Til was not trying to say that one had to have exhaustive knowledge of some fact before he could know that fact but that one had to understand that all facts imply an ultimate ground for their existence. I believe, then, there is an important distinction to be made between what Van Til meant by connotation and how he actually used the term in his system. The former is much richer yet the latter more easily employed from a practical point of view.

With this distinction in mind can we provide an answer to the question of the type and nature of R*? The answer does not come readily. If the relation is epistemic, (that is, if the person must know this presupposition in the connotative sense in order to know any other thing) we are involved in a vicious circle.[35] For how does one come to know F­_G without first being in this epistemic relation? If the relation is not epistemic, how does it do any work in so far as it is functioning as a means by which F­­_G enters into the noetic structure of a person as an item of knowledge? A fuller answer to this will have to be deferred until later. At this point, it may be sufficient to say that this relation is epistemic but in a special sort of way.

It seems that for Van Til there is a special subclass of beliefs that are justified on the basis of the means by which they were formed.[36] The closest analog may be the notion of basic beliefs (however the pool of what might be considered basic for Van Til is much smaller than that of most later Reformed thinkers). Provisionally I will use the term awareness[37] to refer this idea. Greater detail on how this awareness functions epistemically will be explicated below.

With this background we can return to our initial proposition and expand upon the idea of the relation that obtains between S and F_G (the fundamental presupposition). S presupposes God’s existence just in case,

(5) ­God created S with an awareness of Himself.
and
(6) The awareness S has of God is validated by B.

What Van Til is attempting to do is bring his entire theology and philosophy into the knowledge event by collapsing ontology and epistemology into a unified whole. A key idea in this attempt is that of the nature of man as a being created by God. For only if God created man could he stand in a direct epistemic relation to the fact of God’s existence.

As mentioned above, Van Til emphasizes the unity of man within the “epistemically compatible” environment (i.e., the natural world) within which God created him. “God has created the human mind. In this human mind God has laid the laws of thought according to which it is to operate.”[38] The former idea is not fully expressed in (5) however. (5) would have to provide insight into what the awareness of God entails as well as how God’s creation of S relates to this awareness.

(5¢) God created S with a noetic faculty that is immediately aware of God’s existence such that S pre-reflectively believes the fact “God exists” is true.

With (5¢) not only is God designing the noetic faculty of man to be able to receive a belief about His existence, He somehow is causing man to have the very belief itself. Notice also that this belief is not limited to believers. This is not a belief that is somehow “inserted” at the time of salvation. By including the phrase “pre-reflective” I intend to bring in the idea that this assent to God’s existence is present in the noetic structure of all persons. Thus atheism would be learned and theism would be the normal, “default” position epistemically.

(5¢) is too strong however. It is not the case that everyone who reflects on the question, “Does God exist?” answers it positively and Van Til did not want to argue for that.[39] However what is true, Van Til argued, is that no one can consistently deny that God exists and affirm any other fact. Any attempt to do so leaves one with epistemic gaps or holes that cannot be filled with any other fact except the fact that God exists.

Intension

Here is where Van Til’s usage of denotation and connotation come to full play. By using these terms as he does, he indicates that knowledge is, in some sense, degreed. One can know fully or partially (one recalls Paul’s statement in 1 Corinthians 13:12). How connotation functions in this context is not to explain how one might know any given fact but how one is aware that God exists. That is, knowledge of God’s existence is directly related to one’s ability to fully know any given fact. (I will use the term intension for this property and will explain intension more fully below.) (5¢) can be modified to account for this lack of fullness knowledge of a fact can have.

(5¢¢) God created S with a noetic faculty that is immediately aware of God’s existence such that S’s belief in F is underintended for S when not based upon F_G.

(5¢¢) locates S’s awareness of Go

by Dr. Phil Fernandes
A chapter from his doctoral dissertation
© 1997, Institute of Biblical Defense, All Rights Reserved

Gordon Haddon Clark (1902-1985) was the Chairman of the Philosophy Department at Butler University for 28 years. 1 He and Cornelius Van Til were the two greatest proponents of the presuppositional method of apologetics. In this chapter, Clark’s apologetic views will be examined, and the strengths and weaknesses of these views will be discussed.

CLARK’S REJECTION OF TRADITIONAL APOLOGETICS

Gordon Clark rejected the idea that unaided human reason could arrive at truths about God. Due to this fact, he rejected traditional apologetics. Clark stated that “The cosmological argument for the existence of God, most fully developed by Thomas Aquinas, is a fallacy. It is not possible to begin with sensory experience and proceed by the formal laws of logic to God’s existence as a conclusion.” 2 After listing several reasons why he rejected the Thomistic arguments for God’s existence, Clark added that even if the arguments were valid, they would only prove the existence of a lesser god. They would not prove the existence of the true God of the Bible. 3

Clark not only despised the use of philosophical arguments to provide evidence for God’s existence, but he also deplored the utilization of historical evidences in defense of Christianity. Clark reminded his readers that the facts of history do not come with their own built-in interpretation. He states that “Significance, interpretation, evaluation is not given in any fact; it is an intellectual judgment based on some non-sensory criterion.” 4

Clark declared that while the conclusions of science constantly change, Scriptural truth remains the same. 5 Therefore, believers should not rely on observable facts to prove Christianity. Instead, Christians must presuppose the truth of God’s Word and allow revelation to interpret the facts of history for them. 6

The reason behind Clark’s distaste for traditional apologetics was his belief that unaided human reason could never discover any truth, religious or secular. This, Clark believed, should convince one of his need to presuppose the truth of the Christian revelation. 7 Without this presupposition, man cannot find truth. Clark emphasized this point at the conclusion of his textbook on the history of philosophy. He stated, “Does this mean that philosophers and cultural epochs are nothing but children who pay their fare to take another ride on the merry-go-round? Is this Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence? Or, could it be that a choice must be made between skeptical futility and a word from God?” 8

CLARK’S REJECTION OF EMPIRICISM

Empiricism is the attempt to find truth through the five senses. This school of thought believes “that all knowledge begins in sense experience.” 9

According to Clark, Thomas Aquinas was an empiricist. Aquinas believed that “all knowledge must be abstracted out of our sensations.” 10 Aquinas believed that each person begins life with his mind as a blank slate. He held that “everything that is in the mind was first in the senses, except the mind itself.” 11 Although Aquinas believed that God created man’s mind with the innate ability to know things and draw rational conclusions from sense data, Clark does not seem to do justice to this aspect of Aquinas’ thought. 12 Instead, he merely attacks the idea that man could argue from sense data to the existence of God.

Clark turns next to William Paley. Paley argued from the evidence of design in the universe to the existence of an intelligent God as its Cause. Therefore, he, like Aquinas, began with sense experience and then argued to the existence of God. Clark agreed with the criticisms made by David Hume concerning the teleological argument (the argument for God’s existence from design). Hume stated that experience cannot determine if there was one God or several gods who designed the world. Second, since the physical world is finite, nothing in man’s experience tells him that its designer must be infinite. And third, since human experience includes such things as natural disasters, might not the world’s designer be an evil being? 13

Clark pointed out that Hume himself was an empiricist. But Hume was consistent in his thinking. Therefore, he realized that the principle of cause and effect, the existence of external bodies, and the reality of internal selves could not be proven through sense data alone. Therefore, Hume admitted that his empiricism inevitably led to skepticism. 14

Clark emphasized the point that there is a wide gap between basic sense experience and the propositional conclusions made by empiricists. 15 Sense data (the facts of experience) do not come with their own built-in interpretation. Rational conclusions cannot come from sense experience alone. Empiricism, therefore, fails as a truth-finding method. Next, Gordon Clark turned his attention to rationalism.

CLARK’S REJECTION OF RATIONALISM

Rationalism is the attempt to find truth through reason alone. Though Clark admitted that Augustine was not a pure rationalist, he discussed his views of reason. 16 At a time when Greek philosophy was dominated by skepticism, which argued against the possibility of attaining knowledge, Augustine attempted to find a base for knowledge that could not be denied. 17 Augustine declared that “the skeptic must exist in order to doubt his own existence.” 18 Augustine therefore reasoned that even the skeptic should be certain of his existence. Augustine also showed that skeptics could not live like knowledge was impossible. 18

Augustine also held that the laws of logic were universal, eternal, and unchanging truths. Since the human mind is limited and changing, it could not be the ultimate source of these eternal truths.

Hence, there must be an eternal and unchanging Mind as their source. Obviously, this eternal Mind is God. 19

Clark critiqued the views of Anselm. Anselm was even more rationalistic in his thought than Augustine. He believed that the existence of God could be proven through reason alone. Anselm referred to God as the greatest conceivable Being. Therefore, if God does not exist, then one could conceive of a being greater than Him, a being that has the same attributes but does exist. But then this would be the greatest conceivable Being. Therefore, God (the greatest conceivable Being) must necessarily exist. 20 This is called the ontological argument for God’s existence.

Clark wrote that Rene Descartes, also a rationalist, viewed sensation and experience as very deceptive. He attempted to find a single point of certainty by doubting everything until he found something he could not doubt. Through this process, he realized that the more he doubted, the more certain he became of the existence of himself, the doubter. 21

Descartes borrowed Anselm’s ontological argument for God’s existence. Clark stated Descartes’ version of this argument as follows: “God, by definition, is the being who possesses all perfections; existence is a perfection; therefore God exists.” 22

Clark related that Spinoza also used the ontological argument for God’s existence. But Spinoza’s version of the argument did not conclude with the God of the Bible. Instead he “proved” the existence of a god who is the universe (the god of pantheism). 23 However, this raised questions as to rationalism’s claim to prove the existence of God with certainty. For Spinoza’s god and Descartes’ God cannot both exist. Spinoza was also more consistent in his rationalism than was Descartes. Spinoza realized that if all knowledge could be found through reason alone, then supernatural revelation was without value. 24

Gordon Clark listed several problems with rationalism in his writings. He stated that rationalism has historically led to several contradictory conclusions (theism, pantheism, and atheism). 25 Also, Clark stated that “rationalism does not produce first principles out of something else: The first principles are innate . . . Every philosophy must have its first principles . . . Thus a presuppositionless description is impossible.” 26 Although Clark made much use of reason in his own defense of the faith, he presupposed his first principles. He contended that without doing this, reason can never get off the ground. 27

CLARK’S REJECTION OF IRRATIONALISM

In discussing the history of philosophy, Clark states that “Hume had reduced empiricism to skepticism.” 28 Immanuel Kant’s views left man with a knowledge of “things-as-they-appear-to-us,” but with no real knowledge of “things-in-themselves.” 29 Clark emphasized this point with the following words: “In his view the uninformed sense data are entirely incoherent. Order is introduced into them by the mind alone, and what the real world might be like remains unknowable. The whole Postkantian development from Jacobi to Hegel convicts Kant of skepticism.” 30

Clark added that though Hegel effectively critiqued Kant, Hegelianism also failed to justify knowledge. 31 In Hegel’s theory of the unfolding of history, truth was seen as relative. What was true yesterday is not necessarily true today. 32 In short, the greatest minds the world has ever known have failed to escape skepticism. The philosophy of man cannot even prove that man can know anything. Empiricism and rationalism have both failed. This has caused some thinkers to accept irrationalism as the method of finding meaning to life. One such thinker was Soren Kierkegaard.

Kierkegaard denied the effectiveness of both reason and sense experience in finding truth. He believed that a man must stop reasoning. Only through a blind leap of faith can man find true meaning in life. An individual’s subjective passion is of more importance than objective truth. Kierkegaard believed that the doctrines of Christianity were absurd and contradictory. Still, he chose to believe against all reason. 33

Clark rejected the irrationalism of Kierkegaard even though it had become so widespread among modern thinkers, both secular and religious. Clark stated of Kierkegaard, “The fatal flaw is his rejection of logic. When once a man commits himself to contradictions, his language, and therefore his recommendations to other people, become meaningless.” 34

As shown above, Gordon Clark rejected empiricism, rationalism, and irrationalism. He taught that they all eventually reduce to skepticism. Man has failed to find truth through these methodologies. Therefore, man, according to Clark, must make a choice between skepticism and a word from God. 35 Clark’s method of finding truth is called presuppositionalism or dogmatism.

CLARK’S VIEW: DOGMATISM

When one finds that Clark saw all of secular philosophy as unable to justify knowledge, one might assume that Clark was himself a skeptic. But this was not the case. Skeptical futility is not the only option left. Clark referred to his view of finding truth as dogmatism. Clark argued that if all other philosophical systems cannot give meaning to life, then dogmatism is worth a try. Clark recommended that one dogmatically presuppose the truth of the teachings of Scripture. 36

Clark’s view may seem to some to be fideism. But this is not so (according to Clark). For everyone, no matter what their philosophical system may be, must presuppose something. 37 The rationalist must presuppose his first principles. Otherwise, he must look for reasons for everything. This would result in an infinite regress, and there would be no real base for knowledge. 38

The empiricist must assume certain concepts which he cannot prove through sense experience. Such concepts as time, space, equality, causality, and motion are not derived from sense experience. They are brought into one’s sense experience in the beginning to aid one in drawing conclusions from the sense data. 39 Logical Positivism is an extreme empirical view. One of its first principles is that truth can only be found through the five senses. However, this first principle refutes itself since it cannot itself be proven through the five senses. 40

Clark argued that since rationalism and empiricism have failed to make life meaningful, Christian presuppositions should be utilized. For Christian presuppositions do give meaning to life. 41 Clark argued that “Christian Theism is self-consistent and that several other philosophies are inconsistent, skeptical, and therefore erroneous.” 42 Clark added that Christianity “gives meaning to life and morality, and that it supports the existence of truth and the possibility of knowledge.” 43

One can see Clark’s point more clearly by examining his critique of Kant. In Kant’s thinking, there existed no order in sense data. Instead the mind introduces this order into the sense data. Therefore, Kant’s view collapses into skepticism since one can only know things-as-they-appear-to-us and not things-as-they-are. One cannot know the real world. One can only know the world as it appears to him. 44

Clark’s response to Kant’s dilemma is as follows. Clark presupposes the truth of the revelation found in Scripture. Therefore, Clark presupposes that “God has fashioned both the mind and the world so that they harmonize.” 45 If one presupposes the truth of Christianity, then the order that the mind innately reads into the real world is the order which really exists in the real world.

Having discussed Clark’s view of obtaining knowledge, one must now consider how Clark defended Christianity. Clark did this by convincing the nonbeliever that he is contradicting himself. 46 Clark was willing to use logic (the law of noncontradiction) to refute the belief systems of others. He did not feel that he was being inconsistent with his presuppositionalism or dogmatism. For Clark believed that God is Logic. In other words, logic is God-thinking. It flows naturally from God’s Being. 47 In fact, Clark even translated John 1:1 as, “In the beginning was Logic, and Logic was with God, and Logic was God.” 48

The problem with rationalism is that it lacks sufficient first principles. But, according to Clark, once one presupposes the truth of the Bible, one can use reason to tear down the views of others. Clark spoke of reason in the following manner:

Therefore I wish to suggest that we neither abandon reason nor use it unaided; but on pain of skepticism acknowledge a verbal, propositional revelation of fixed truth from God. Only by accepting rationally comprehensible information on God’s authority can we hope to have a sound philosophy and a true religion. 49

Clark not only defended the faith by tearing down other belief systems through use of the law of contradiction, but he (after presupposing the truth of Christianity) also was willing to confirm the truth of Christianity in two ways. First, Clark showed that it alone is self-consistent. And second, he appealed to its ability to provide man with meaning to life, moral values, and the genuine possibility of attaining true knowledge. 50 Since all other philosophies have failed to obtain knowledge, one must choose between skepticism and presupposing Christian revelation. 51

Still, Clark seemed to revert back to fideism. This was due to his hyper-Calvinistic theology. He firmly believed that one really cannot convince another of the truth of Christianity, for God alone sovereignly bestows faith upon an individual. 52 When answering the question of why one person presupposes the Bible to be true and not the Muslim Koran, he simply replied that “God causes the one to believe.” 53

CLARK’S SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

In his writings, Gordon Clark attempted to answer the question,

“How can the existence of God be harmonized with the existence of evil?” 54 If God is all-good, He would want to destroy evil. If God is all-powerful, He is able to destroy evil. But evil still exists. It seems that God cannot be both all-good and all-powerful. However, Christianity teaches that He is both. This is the problem of evil. 55

Zoroastrianism attempts to resolve the problem by teaching that there are two gods. One is good while the other is evil. Neither of the two gods is infinite since they have both failed to destroy the opposing god. Plato’s views also result in an unresolved dualism. In his thought, God is not the creator of all things. There exists eternal and chaotic space which the Demiurge cannot control. 56

According to Clark, even Augustine’s answer to the dilemma was inadequate. Clark stated that Augustine taught that evil is metaphysically unreal. It does not exist. Therefore, all that God created is good since evil is non-being. 57 (Whether or not Clark treated Augustine’s view fairly will be discussed at a later point in this chapter.)

Clark pointed out that Augustine added to his response the doctrine of human free will. Though God is all-powerful, He has sovereignly chosen to give mankind free will. God allows man to make his own choices. Mankind has chosen evil. Therefore, all that God created is good. Evil can be blamed not on God, but on the abuse of free will by man. 58

But Clark rejected this view of free will. Clark believed that the Bible does not teach that man is free to choose that which is right as opposed to that which is wrong. Clark stated that “free will is not only futile, but false. Certainly, if the Bible is the Word of God, free will is false; for the Bible consistently denies free will.” 59

Though Clark rejected the doctrine of free will, he believed man has free agency. “Free will means there is no determining factor operating on the will, not even God. Free will means that either of two incompatible actions are equally possible.” 60 This Clark rejected. On the other hand, “Free agency goes with the view that all choices are inevitable. The liberty that the Westminster Confession ascribes to the will is a liberty from compulsion, coaction, or force of inanimate objects; it is not a liberty from the power of God.” 61 Clark argued that a man can still be responsible for his actions even without the freedom to do other than he has done. Clark stated that, “a man is responsible if he must answer for what he does . . . a person is responsible if he can be justly rewarded or punished for his deeds. This implies, of course, that he must be answerable to someone.” 62

Clark then asked the question, “Is it just then for God to punish a man for deeds that God Himself ‘determined before to be done?’” 63 He answered in the affirmative. He stated that, “Whatever God does is just.” 64 Man is responsible to God; but God is responsible to no one.

Clark openly admitted that his view makes God the cause of sin. For, in his thinking, “God is the sole ultimate cause of everything.” 65 But, while God is the ultimate cause of sin, He is not the author of sin. The author is the immediate cause of an action. Man is the immediate cause of his sin. But he was not free to do otherwise. For God is the ultimate cause of sin. 66

Clark stated that, “God’s causing a man to sin is not sin. There is no law, superior to God, which forbids him to decree sinful acts. Sin presupposes a law, for sin is lawlessness.” 67 Clark explained that “God is above law” because “the laws that God imposes on men do not apply to the divine nature.” 68

Clark stated:

Man is responsible because God calls him to account; man is responsible because the supreme power can punish him for disobedience. God, on the contrary, cannot be responsible for the plain reason that there is no power superior to him; no greater being can hold him accountable; no one can punish him; there is no one to whom God is responsible; there are no laws which he could disobey.

The sinner therefore, and not God, is responsible; the sinner alone is the author of sin. Man has no free will, for salvation is purely of grace; and God is sovereign. 69

This was Clark’s proposed solution to the problem of evil. God is in fact the ultimate cause of sin. But He is not evil, for He committed no sin. And He is not responsible for sin, for there is no one to whom He is responsible. God is just, for whatever He does is just. Therefore, the creature has no right to stand in judgment over his Creator.

STRENGTHS OF CLARK’S PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

Gordon Clark, as this study shows, was a very original thinker. Even if one disagrees with much of what he has written, he has made a tremendous contribution to Christian thought that should not be overlooked. There are several strengths which are evident in the thought of Gordon Clark.

His rejection of pure rationalism. Clark is absolutely correct when he points out the major deficiency of rationalism. That is, rationalism cannot even get started until certain unproven assumptions are made. Reason cannot prove everything. This would result in an infinite regress, and nothing would be proven. First principles must be presupposed. They are not logically necessary (they cannot be proven with rational certainty).

His rejection of pure empiricism. Clark is right when he points out problems with extreme empiricism. Sense data and the facts of history do not come with their own built-in interpretations. They must be interpreted within the context of a person’s world view. Empirical data alone cannot give us rational conclusions.

His rejection of irrationalism. Clark should be commended for his lack of patience for irrationalism. Once a person denies the law of contradiction, then the opposite of whatever that person teaches can be equally true with those teachings. But all human thought and communication comes to a halt if one allows such an absurd premise. A person who holds to irrationalism cannot even express his view without assuming the truth of the law of contradiction.

His knowledge of the history of philosophical thought. Rarely does one read the works of a Christian author who has the insights that Clark had. His knowledge of the thought of the great philosophical minds of the past should encourage all Christians to be more diligent in their own studies. Gordon Clark was a man who had something to say because he was a man who lived a disciplined life of study. Even if one disagrees with the thrust of Clark’s thought, one must never dismiss the insights he shared with others concerning the history of philosophy.

His recognition of the fact that all people have hidden presuppositions. Too often Christians pretend that they have no biases whatsoever, but this is not the case. Every person, believer and nonbeliever alike, has presuppositions that are often hidden. Clark was right in his view that apologetics is more accurately the seeking of confirmation for our presuppositions than it is the unbiased search for truth.

His use of the law of noncontradiction. Clark was justified in his usage of the law of noncontradiction. If two opposite concepts can both be true at the same time and in the same sense, then all knowledge and communication become impossible. Any world view that either is a contradiction or generates contradictions is not worth believing.

He is very consistent in his Calvinism. Too often Christians claim to be Calvinists but actually deny or redefine several of the five main points of Calvinism. Clark is not only a strong defender of all five points, but he also consistently holds to the implications of these points. His rejection of human free will and his view of God as the ultimate cause of evil are unpopular concepts, even among Calvinists. Clark is to be credited with having the courage to believe that which is consistent with his system of thought.

He is right to seek confirmation for his Christian presuppositions. Many presuppositionalists are content in merely assuming the truth of Christianity. But Clark realizes that, after pre-supposing biblical truth, one must still seek justification for this assumption. Clark does this by showing that Christianity does what all secular philosophies have failed to do. They failed to give meaning to life, justify moral values, and find truth.

He is right that man must choose. Clark recognizes that since all secular philosophies have failed to justify their truth claims, man must make a choice. A person can choose to continue to live with contradictory views. Or a person can choose skepticism and suspend all judgment (except his judgment to be skeptical). Clark even remarks that, for some, suicide is their choice. 70 But Clark pleads with his readers to choose Christianity. If secular philosophies have failed to find truth and give meaning to life, then why not choose Christianity? Whatever the case, man must choose.

THE WEAKNESSES OF CLARK’S PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

His denial of the basic reliability of sense perception. Though Clark is correct when he states that concepts such as moral values, causality, time, and space cannot be derived from sense data alone, he goes too far when he speaks of the “futility of sensation.” 71 With Clark’s distrust for sense experience, how can he presuppose the truth of the Bible? For he must first use his sense of sight to read the Bible to find out what it is he is going to presuppose. In fact, the Bible itself seems to teach the basic reliability of sense perception. The Mosaic Law places great emphasis on eyewitness testimony, and the eyewitness accounts of Christ’s post-resurrection appearances are presented as evidence for the truth of Christ’s claims.

His denial of Thomistic first principles. While refuting rationalism, Clark stated that it needed first principles. For justification must stop somewhere. He pointed out that since first principles could not be proven through reason alone, rationalism fails to find truth without appealing to something other than reason. The first principles are not logically necessary. In this he is correct. However, Clark accepts the law of contradiction (what Thomists call the law of noncontradiction), though he says it is not logically necessary. He points out that if we do not accept this law, all knowledge and communication would cease. However, this is the same type of argument that Aquinas (and Aristotle long before him) used for his remaining first principles. Besides the principle of noncontradiction, Aquinas utilized the principles of identity, excluded middle, causality, and finality. 72 Aristotle and Aquinas argued that these principles “cannot actually be denied without absurdity.” 73 In other words, they are actually undeniable (though not logically necessary). But this is very similar to what Clark claims for one of his first principles, the law of contradiction. If Clark is justified in using this principle, then the other Thomistic first principles of knowledge may likewise be justified. If one accepts the principle of causality (every effect has an adequate cause), then one can reason from the effect (the finite world) to its cause (the infinite Creator). This would deal Clark’s entire system a lethal blow since it would justify the use of traditional arguments for God’s existence. This would eliminate presuppositional apologetics as the only way for a Christian to defend his faith.

His downplaying of historical evidences for the Christian Faith. Clark rightly criticized deriving knowledge from sense data alone. Because of this, he minimized historical evidences. For facts of history, like sense data, do not come with their own built-in interpretations. However, if one accepts Thomistic first principles (because they are actually undeniable), then one can attempt to make sense of the facts of history. If a man claimed to be God and rose from the dead to prove His claim true, then one is not justified in explaining this resurrection in purely naturalistic terms. For every event must have an adequate cause. And no naturalistic explanation has succeeded to account for the resurrection. 74 Only a supernatural cause is sufficient in this case.

He gives no credit to probability arguments. Clark points out that other systems of philosophy do not have a starting point based on certainty. They must presuppose their first principles. However, Clark’s own first principles are also not based on certainty; they too must be presupposed. It seems that Clark is judging his own philosophical system in a more lenient fashion than he does other schools of thought. It is true that Clark finds confirmation for the Christian presupposition that is lacking in other presuppositions. Still, this is after the fact. And, as Clark admits, this confirmation itself only makes Christianity more probable than other views; it does not establish its certainty. It seems that more credit should be given to arguments for first principles based upon a high degree of probability. Why should an argument be rejected when its premises and conclusion are very probable, while opposing views are unlikely?

Other philosophers have settled for less than certainty but still have solid systems of thought. Some might argue from premises that they believe are “beyond all reasonable doubt.” Norman Geisler, following in the tradition of Thomas Aquinas, uses the principle of “actual undeniability.” 75 Some things cannot be denied without contradiction and therefore must be true. For instance, if I deny my existence I must first exist to make the denial. For nothing is nothing. Nothing cannot deny anything. Only an existent being can deny something. Therefore, it is actually undeniable that I exist. 76

Charles Hodge (1797-1878) based his philosophical arguments on what he believed were “self-evident truths.” Though these truths could be denied by others, their denial is “forced and temporary.”

Once a philosopher finishes lecturing or debating, he returns to the real world and no longer denies self-evident truths such as his existence, the existence of others, and the reality of moral values. 77 He can deny moral values in the lecture hall, but once he is at home, he calls the police when he is robbed.

It seems then that Clark is mistaken. Christians can discover truths that are either “self-evident” or “actually undeniable.” They can then dialogue with nonbelievers using these premises as common ground. Clark was wrong not to give proper due to first principles based upon a high degree of probability. This leaves the door open for traditional apologetics.

His attacks on traditional apologetics. Clark’s attack on traditional apologetics is unfounded. This can be shown from his treatment of the Thomistic cosmological argument for God’s existence. Aquinas argued that all existent beings which could possibly not exist need a cause or ground for their continuing in existence. In other words, all dependent existence must rely for its continued existence on a totally independent Being, a Being which is uncaused and self-existent. 78

Clark comments that Aquinas has not ruled out the possibility of an infinite regress of dependent beings. 79 However, Clark is mistaken. For Aquinas is not arguing indefinitely into the past. He is arguing for the current existence of a totally independent Being. Aquinas is arguing for the cause of the continued and present existence of dependent beings, not just the cause for the beginning of their existence. 80 Aquinas is pointing out that if one takes away the independent Being, then there is nothing to sustain the existence of all dependent beings. Every dependent being relies directly on the independent Being for preserving it in existence. The causality is simultaneous, just as a person’s face simultaneously causes the existence of its reflection in a mirror. At the exact moment the person moves his face, the reflection is gone.

Clark raises another objection against the Thomistic cosmological argument. He states that even if the argument is valid, it would not prove the existence of the God of the Bible. Clark seems to imply that unless we prove every attribute of God, then it is not the identical God. 81 However, if Aquinas proves the existence of the Uncaused Cause of all else that exists, how could this possibly not be the God of the Bible? If Clark can refer to God as “Truth” and “Logic” and still be talking about the Triune God of the Bible, then Aquinas can identify God with the “Unmoved Mover.”

Finally, Clark accuses Aquinas of using the word “exist” with two completely different meanings. 82 When Aquinas speaks of God, he speaks of God existing infinitely. But when he speaks of man, he speaks of man existing finitely. God is existence; man merely has existence. Though Clark’s critique may seem valid, it is not. Aquinas would define existence as “that which is” whether it referred to God or man. True, Aquinas would apply the term “existence” to God infinitely, but to man only finitely. Still, the fact remains that whether Aquinas speaks of God or man, the meaning of existence remains the same.

Apparently, Clark misunderstands Aquinas’ view of analogical language. Aquinas taught that we cannot have univocal (totally the same) knowledge of God. Still, our knowledge of God is not equivocal (totally different) since that would be no knowledge at all. Instead, according to Aquinas, our knowledge of God is analogical (similar). By this Aquinas did not mean that the concepts used of God and man have similar meanings. He meant that they have identical meanings, but that they must be applied only in a similar way. All limitations must be removed from a concept before it is applied to God. However, the concept itself continues to have the same meaning throughout. 83

Not only did Clark express distaste for the cosmological argument for God’s existence, he also disliked the teleological argument (the argument from design). 84 He accepted Hume’s criticism of this argument. Hume concluded that it proved the existence only of a finite god or gods, and that this god or gods may be evil (due to the evil in the world). However, if one argues for the existence of one infinite God through the cosmological argument, and then finishes the argument with the teleological premises, the argument from design will add the attribute of intelligence to the Uncaused Cause. The problem of evil could also be dealt with as a separate issue. In short, Clark’s attempt to destroy traditional apologetics has failed.

His failure to refute the Islamic Faith. After destroying secular philosophy through the use of the law of contradiction, Clark does not apply this law to Islam. Instead, he merely states that God causes some to accept the Bible when answering the question, “Why does one man accept the Koran and another the Bible?” 85 Apparently, after all is said and done, Clark’s system relies on God alone to cause the person to believe. One wonders why Clark went to such trouble to refute secular philosophies. Could not the same response be given to them?

His misrepresentation of Augustine and Aquinas. While dealing with the problem of evil, Clark accused Augustine of denying the reality of evil. He stated that Augustine taught that “all existing things are good” and that “evil therefore does not exist—it is metaphysically unreal.” 86 Clark represented Augustine as reasoning that since evil does not exist, God cannot be the cause of evil. 87 In this way, Clark makes it sound as if Augustine is in agreement with the Christian Science view of evil as an illusion. Clark, is misrepresenting Augustine on this point.

Augustine did teach that God created everything that exists and that all that God created is good. However, evil is a perversion of that good brought about by the free choices of rational beings (fallen angels and men). Evil is a privation. It is a lack of a good that should be there. 88 An illustration of this would be rust. God did not create rust. Still it exists, but only as a corruption of something that God created (metal). Therefore, evil is real, but it must exist in some good thing that God created. All that God created is good. God did not create evil. He created the possibility of evil (free will). Fallen rational beings actualized evil by abusing a good thing (free will) God gave them.

Clark also misrepresents Aquinas by implying that Aquinas is a strict empiricist. It is true that Aquinas believed all knowledge comes through sense experience; he taught that God created man’s mind with the innate ability to draw rational conclusions from sense data. Aquinas spoke of both the active mind (this innate ability to arrive at universals from particulars) and the receptive mind (the aspect of the mind which receives data from sense experience). Clark seems to view Aquinas as only holding to the existence of the receptive mind. He chooses to ignore Aquinas’ teaching about the active mind (also called the agent intellect). 89

His proposed solution to the problem of evil. Clark’s answer to the problem of evil is inadequate. He stated that God is not responsible for evil simply because there is no one above Him to whom He is responsible. Since Clark denied human free will (man could not choose to do otherwise), Clark made God the ultimate cause of evil.

The Augustinian approach, in the opinion of many Christian philosophers, is to be preferred. Augustine held that God gave man the freedom to disobey His commands. Therefore, God permitted sin; it was not part of His perfect will for man. A free will theodicy (attempting to propose a reason why God permitted evil) or a free will defense (attempting to merely show that it is not impossible for an all-good and all-powerful God to coexist with evil) is a much more plausible solution to the problem of evil than the solution Clark proposed. 90 Of course, since Clark denied genuine free will, these options were not open to him.

He does not allow for the use of secular material during evangelism. Clark states, “in evangelistic work there can be no appeal to secular, non-Christian material.” 91 However, this is exactly what the apostle Paul did on Mars Hill. When speaking to Stoic and Epicurean philosophers, he quoted from the writings of two ancient Greek poets to find common ground with his hearers (Acts 17:16-34). If one must choose between the evangelistic approach of Gordon Clark and that of the apostle Paul, then one should choose Paul.

No Christian can show that every non-Christian system of thought is inconsistent. Clark claims that since every non-Christian philosophy has failed, people should presuppose the truth of the Christian world view. However, it is impossible for Clark, or any other person, to thoroughly examine every non-Christian system of thought. 92 Even if it were possible for Clark to expose the contradictions in every non-Christian world view today, there is no guarantee that a totally consistent non-Christian world view will not be produced in the future. 93

CONCLUSION

Clark’s presuppositional approach to apologetics, with minor adaptions, is a worthy apologetic. Uncovering contradictions in non-Christian belief systems is a necessary component in one’s defense of the faith. However, Clark’s presuppositional approach is not the only method Christians can use when defending the faith. Although Clark successfully demolishes several secular philosophies, traditional apologetics survives his assault.

ENDNOTES

1   Gordon H. Clark, Clark Speaks From the Grave (Jefferson: The Trinity Foundation, 1986), 2.

2   Gordon H. Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation (Jefferson: The Trinity Foundation, 1986), 35.

3   Ibid., 37.

4   Clark, Clark Speaks From the Grave, 54.

5   Ibid., 55.

6   Ibid., 57.

7   Geisler, Apologetics, 37.

8   Gordon H. Clark, Thales to Dewey (Jefferson: The Trinity Foundation, 1989), 534.

9   Geisler and Feinberg, 431.

10  Gordon H. Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy (Jefferson: The Trinity Foundation, 1989), 60-61.

11  Geisler, Thomas Aquinas, 86.

12  Ibid.

13  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 64-70.

14  Ibid., 71,76-78.

15  Ibid., 91.

16  Ibid., 27.

17  Ibid., 28-29.

18  Ibid., 31.

19  Ibid., 32.

20  Ibid., 33-35.

21  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 50-51.

22  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 35.

23  Clark, Thales to Dewey, 332.

24  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 53.

25  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 56.

26  Ibid., 117-118.

27  Ibid., 120.

28  Ibid., 93.

29  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 62.

30  Gordon H. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things (Jefferson: The Trinity Foundation, 1991), 315-316.

31  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 63-68.

32  Ibid., 98.

33  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 101-105.

34  Ibid., 114.

35  Clark, Thales to Dewey, 534.

36  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 116.

37  Ibid., 118.

38  Ibid., 51-52.

39  Ibid., 70-91.

40  Ibid., 118-119.

41  Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 324.

42  Ibid.

43  Ibid.

44  Ibid., 315-316.

45  Ibid., 316.

46  Clark, Three Types of religious Philosophy, 140-142.

47  Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley, 76.

48  Ibid.

49  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 87.

50  Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 324.

51  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 109-110.

52  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 138.

53  Ibid., 139.

54  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 195.

55  Ibid.

56  Ibid., 195-196.

57  Ibid., 196.

58  Ibid., 199.

59  Ibid., 206.

60  Ibid., 227.

61  Ibid.

62  Ibid., 231.

63  Ibid.

64  Ibid., 232-233.

65  Ibid., 237-238.

66  Ibid., 237-239.

67  Ibid., 239-240.

68  Ibid., 240.

69  Ibid., 241.

70  Clark, Thales to Dewey, 534.

71  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 91.

72  Geisler, Thomas Aquinas, 72-74.

73  Ibid., 78-79.

74  Habermas, 26-33.

75  Geisler, Christian Apologetics, 143.

76  Ibid., 143-144.

77  Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1989), vol. 1, 210.

78  Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a. 2,3.

79  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 36-37.

80  Craig, Apologetics, 63-65.

81  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 37-38.

82  Ibid., 38-39.

83  Geisler, Thomas Aquinas, 40.

84  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 64-70.

85  Ibid., 139.

86  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 196.

87  Ibid.

88  Augustine, The City of God, 22.1.

89  Geisler, Thomas Aquinas, 86.

90  Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974), 28-31.

91  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 139.

92  Gordon R. Lewis, 119.

93  Ibid., 119-120.