Apr 13 2010

Personal Mentoring by IBD Staff is Back

Gabe Ginorio

The Institute of Biblical Defense, by popular demand, is bringing back the “Certificate Program“. After several requests, Dr. Fernandes, Matt Coombe and the rest of the IBD staff are ready to mentor new students. Already exceedingly popular with pastors worldwide, these courses are usually taken as supplements to existing degrees (i.e. A pastor desperately in need of apologetics training for his congregation). However, all that is about to change.

Are you a student looking for the philosophical background for the doctrine you believe? Are you a pastor confronted to defend his faith in an atheist world? Are you a lay teacher wondering why you believe what you believe and where the beliefs came from? If you’re any of these are just someone seriously seeking the truth, these courses are for you.

Very, very affordable, each course includes a certificate from the Institute and, best of all, personal mentoring by a member of the IBD staff. The qualifications are a sincere faith, a desire to truly know the truth and a solid  to learn.


Apr 7 2010

The Empty Tomb?

Gabe Ginorio

Due to some email correspondence we received around Easter, we’ve decided to publish something in response. This portion of the chapter is not exhaustive, but it does state the some basic arguments against those who would refute the empty tomb.

Excerpt from The Atheist Delusion by Dr. Phil Fernandes, Ph.D.

just over 70% of New Testament scholars accept the empty tomb, rather than the near universal support for the other four pieces of data. There are several reasons which show that the accounts of the empty tomb are probably historical.

First, the first eyewitnesses of the empty tomb (and the resurrected Christ) were women. This is something the apostles would not have made up, for a woman’s testimony was held highly suspect in the first-century ad. It offered practically no evidential value to fabricate a story of women being the first witnesses. Plus, the principle of embarrassment applies here. For, it would have been very embarrassing for the two leading apostles, Peter and John, to have been proven wrong by ladies. This would be horrible public relations for the early church. The only reason for reporting that women were the first witnesses of the empty tomb would be if it was actually true.

The Empty Tomb

Second, if Jesus did not rise from the dead, then the Jewish religious authorities would have produced the rotting corpse of Christ, thus refuting Christianity and stifling its growth at its earliest stage. But this did not happen—Christianity grew at a tremendous rate in the early 30′s ad in the Jerusalem area. This would not be the case if Jesus’ body was still in the tomb.

Third, New Testament scholars agree that the sermons of Acts chapter 1 through 12 are the earliest sermons of the church-they date back to the early 30′s ad. Their antiquity is accepted by scholars because these sermons show no signs of theological development (this type of theological development is found in Paul’s letters which were written twenty years later).4 These sermons seem to report the events of the resurrection at the earliest stage of the church. One of the main themes of these early sermons was the resurrection of Jesus. Hence, the resurrection of Jesus was reported shortly after Christ’s crucifixion by people who claimed to be eyewitnesses and who were willing to suffer and die for their proclamation. Men do not die for what they know to be a hoax-they sincerely believed they saw the risen Christ.

Fourth, Jesus was buried in the tomb of a well-known man-Joseph of Arimathea. It would have been easy to locate the tomb to ascertain if it was empty. Many critics acknowledge the reliability of the account of Jesus being buried in Joseph’s tomb.5 For, if there was no real Joseph of Arimathea on the Jewish Ruling Council, then this account would be easily refuted by the enemies of the early church. However, once we admit that there existed a man named Joseph of Arimathea on the Jewish Ruling Council, then it is highly unlikely the apostles fabricated this account. Joseph would have been easy to find-there were only 70 members on the Sanhedrin and they met regularly in Jerusalem. If the apostles lied about the burial, then one could interview Joseph of Arimathea to check the account to disprove it. But, once we admit Jesus was buried in the tomb of a famous man, then we must acknowledge how easy it would have been to prove the corpse was still in the tomb, had it actually been there. But, this did not happen. Hence, the tomb was empty.


Mar 28 2010

Interview with Dr. Fernandes on Apologetics 3:15

Gabe Ginorio

From Apologetics 3:15:

“Today’s interview is with pastor and apologist Phil Fernandes. He talks about his influences as a Christian apologist and philosopher, his debate with Michael Martin, notable books, his most recent book The Atheist Delusion, insights and advice for apologists, apologetics methodology, his vast treasure trove of audio resources, and more.”

Check out the rest on Apologetics 3:15.


Jul 29 2009

Bart Ehrman’s Questionable Objections

Gabe Ginorio

Finally, The Christian World View is back on the air.  Wasting no time, Dr. Fernandes and Matt Coombe get right to the most relevant issues in the apologetics today.  In this episode, the questionable New Testament criticisms of Bart Ehrman Ph.D., chair of the Religious Studies department at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, are analyzed in light of modern scholarship.

Not scared to be honest and tough, Dr. Fernandes and Matt Coombe defend the Christian faith using the latest modern scholarship.  Find out who Bart Ehrman is, why he believes what he believes, where he comes from and how he draws his controversial conclusions. One by one, Ehrman’s criticisms about the unreliability of the New Testament manuscripts are tackled head-on.

Don’t be fooled by those purporting to prove the unreliability of the New Testament manuscripts; They are reliable.

Listen to this entertaining and enlightening episode now, online, click the PodCast icon to the right to use iTunes, or download this in mp3 format now.


May 25 2007

Is Jesus God?

Gabe Ginorio

by Dr. Phil Fernandes
A chapter from his doctoral dissertation
© 1997, Institute of Biblical Defense, All Rights Reserved

The deity of Christ is hard to accept for many people. For one to admit that Jesus is God in the flesh is to admit that he owes Him complete allegiance. Recognition of Jesus’ Godhood calls for the abandonment of one’s autonomy. Therefore, many people refuse to worship Jesus as God and consider Him to be merely a great human teacher. Mohandas K. Gandhi said of Christ:

It was more than I could believe that Jesus was the only incarnate son of God. And that only he who believed in Him would have everlasting life. If God could have sons, all of us were His sons. If Jesus was like God . . . then all men were like God and could be God Himself.1

The internationally respected theologian, John Hick, also denies Christ’s deity:

Now it used to be assumed—and in some Christian circles is still assumed—that this Jesus, who lived in Palestine in the first third of the first century AD, was conscious of being God incarnate, so that you must either believe him or reject him as a deceiver or a megalomaniac. “Mad, bad, or God” went the argument. And of course if Jesus did indeed claim to be God incarnate, then this dilemma, or trilemma, does arise. But did he claim this? The assumption that he did is largely based on the Fourth Gospel, for it is here that Jesus makes precisely such claims. He says “I and the Father are one,” “No one comes to the Father, but by me” and “He who has seen me has seen the Father.” But it is no secret today, after more than a hundred years of scholarly study of the scriptures, that very few New Testament experts now hold that the Jesus who actually lived ever spoke those words, or their Aramaic equivalents. They are much more probably words put into his mouth by a Christian writer who is expressing the view of Christ which had been arrived at in his part of the church, probably two or three generations after Jesus’ death. And it is likewise doubted whether the few sayings of the same kind in the other gospels are authentic words of Jesus. How, then, did this Christian deification of Jesus—which began within the first decades after his death and was essentially completed by the end of the first century—take place? Such a development is not as hard to understand in the ancient world as it would be today. . .2

It is interesting that Hick admits that the New Testament, quotes Jesus as claiming to be God. Second, he acknowledges that the deity of Christ was being taught within a few decades of Christ’s death (which is what the creeds prove). And, third, Hick recognizes that the deity of Christ was completely established as church doctrine by the end of the first century AD. However, by admitting these three facts, Hick is inadvertently conceding that all the available evidence points to the authenticity of Christ’s claims to be God. Surely the apostles would have stopped this heresy (if indeed it was a heresy) when it started just decades after Christ’s death. The Apostle John would also have opposed this teaching as it was being established as church dogma at the end of the first century AD.

Contrary to what John Hick believes, true scholarship bases its decisions on the evidence, not on mere speculation. All the available evidence points to the fact that Christ did claim to be God. The eyewitnesses who heard these claims died horrible deaths refusing to deny their validity. No liberal scholar has ever proposed an adequate explanation as to how a legend that Jesus claimed to be God could develop while the original apostles (those who personally knew Christ) were still alive and leading the new church. Legends take centuries to develop into dogma.3 Any attempted origination of legends cannot get started while honest eyewitnesses are still alive (especially if these honest eyewitnesses hold positions of authority in the church). Therefore, liberal scholars like Hick can believe what they wish. However, to deny that Christ claimed to be God is to simply ignore all the available evidence. Liberal scholars throw out any passages of the Bible that do not agree with their antisupernaturalistic biases, but this is not true scholarship. True scholarship examines the evidence; it does not speculate as to how the evidence can be explained away. The World Book Encyclopedia is an example of the high regard in which many people esteem Jesus, while stopping short of calling Him God:

Jesus Christ was the founder of the Christian religion. Christians believe that He is the Son of God who was sent to earth to save mankind. Even many persons who are not Christians believe that He was a great and wise teacher. He has probably influenced humanity more than anyone else who ever lived.4

It is not wise to call Jesus merely a great man and teacher since He claimed to be God. For no merely great man or wise teacher would claim to be God. If Jesus claimed to be God, then we must view Him as either a liar, insane, or God. There are no other alternatives, and no ignoring of the evidence will help.

JESUS CLAIMED TO BE GOD

In chapter twenty-five it was shown that the message found in the New Testament is one and the same as the message of the first generation church. The ancient creeds found in the New Testament predate the New Testament and represent the teachings of the apostles themselves.5 Several of these ancient creeds teach the deity of Christ (Philippians 2:5-11; Romans 10:9-10; 1 Timothy 3:16). Therefore, there is no reason to doubt that Jesus claimed to be God. The leaders of the first generation church taught that Jesus is God, and they were willing to die for their testimony. Hence, there is no reason (apart from an a priori bias) to reject the claims of deity made by Christ in the New Testament. The Jews understood that Jesus was claiming to be God:

But He answered them, “My Father is working until now, and I myself am working.” For this cause the Jews were seeking all the more to kill Him, because He not only was breaking the Sabbath, but also was calling God His own Father, making Himself equal with God (John 5:17-18).

Whenever Jesus spoke of a unique Father-Son relationship between God the Father and Himself, the Jews understood Him to be claiming equality with God the Father. Jesus spoke to the Jews in their language. He communicated to them on their terms. They understood Jesus to be claiming to be deity. If Jesus never meant to claim to be God, then He was one of the poorest communicators who ever lived. If Jesus was misunderstood by His listeners, He should have clarified His words. A clear and articulate representation of His words would have been in His best interest; He was executed for blasphemy (Mark 14:60-64).

Jesus taught that He deserved the same honor that the Father deserved:

For not even the Father judges anyone, But He has given all judgment to the Son, in order that all may honor the Son, even as they honor the Father. He who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent Him (John 5:22-23).

Since the Father is God, the honor due Him is worship. Therefore, Jesus taught that He also deserved to be worshiped. Despite the fact that the Old Testament Law forbid the worship of any being other than God (Exodus 20:1-6), Jesus accepted worship on numerous occasions (Matthew 2:11; 14:33; 28:9; John 9:38; 20:28-29). Jesus also stated:

You are from below, I am from above; you are of this world, I am not of this world. I said therefore to you, that you shall die in your sins; for unless you believe that I am He, you shall die in your sins. . . . Truly, truly, I say to you, before Abraham was born, I am (John 8:23-24; 58).

The Jewish religious leaders understood Jesus’ claim to deity in this passage: “they picked up stones to throw at Him” (John 8:59). The comments of J. Dwight Pentecost are helpful:

Christ affirmed, “Before Abraham was born, I am!” (v. 58). “I AM” was the name of the Self-existing God who had revealed Himself to Moses at the burning bush (Exod. 3:14). Jesus Christ was claiming to be “I AM”, the Self-existent God. He was claiming eternity. To the Jews this was blasphemy.6

Merrill C. Tenney also elaborates on this specific claim of Christ:

In actuality the phrase “I am” is an assertion of absolute, timeless existence, not merely of a personal identity as the English equivalent would suggest. A comparison of the use of the phrase, “I am” with self-revelation of Jehovah in the Old Testament shows that much the same terminology was employed. God, in commissioning Moses (Ex. 3:14), said: “Thus shalt thou say to unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you.” When the Jews heard Jesus say, “Before Abraham was born, I am,” they took the statement to mean not priority to Abraham, but an assertion of deity. To them it was blasphemy, and they picked up stones to cast at Him.7

It is important to note two things about this passage. First, Jesus did not say, “Before Abraham was, I was.” This would have been merely a claim to have preexisted Abraham. Though this would be a bold claim in itself, Christ actually said far more than that. Jesus was claiming that His existence is always in the present tense. In other words, He was claiming eternal existence for Himself. He was declaring himself to have absolutely no beginning. He was claiming that He was not bound by time. He was declaring Himself to be the eternal God. Second, Christ probably spoke these words in Aramaic (the common language of the Hebrews of his day). Therefore, He probably did not use the Greek words “ego eimi” for “I AM.” Rather, He would have used the Hebrew “YHWH.” This was the title for the eternal God. Out of reverence for God, the Jews never spoke this word. So here, Christ was not only be speaking the unspeakable title of God (YHWH), but He was using it to refer to Himself. Properly understood, this was probably Christ’s most unambiguous claim to deity. The Jews clearly understood this, and for this reason they attempted to stone him. Another clear claim to deity made by Christ is the following passage:

I and the Father are one.” The Jews took up stones again to stone Him. Jesus answered them, “I showed you many good works from the Father; for which of them are you stoning Me?” The Jews answered Him, “For a good work we do not stone You, but for blasphemy; and because You, being a man, make yourself out to be God” (John 10:30-33).

Concerning this passage, Merrill F. Unger wrote, “Jesus asserted His unity of essence with the Father, hence His unequivocal deity. . . and the Jews understood Him.”8 In this passage, Jesus clearly claimed to be equal with God the Father. Christ said that His nature is identical to that of the Father. The Jews understood Him to be calling Himself God. They later sentenced Him to death for these claims to deity.

Jesus also made other claims to deity. He said that, “He who has seen Me has seen the Father” (John 14:9). When He prayed to the Father, He asked the Father to return to Him the glory which He and the Father shared before the universe was created (John 17:5).

The apostles were Jesus’ closest associates. They were more familiar with the teachings of Christ than anyone else and they called Jesus God (Matthew 1:23; John 1:1; John 20:28; Philippians 2:6; Colossians 2:9; Titus 2:13; 2 Peter 1:1). This is further confirmation that Jesus did in fact claim to be God.

Considering the strong evidence for the reliability of the New Testament, Christ’s claims to deity cannot be considered as legends. The teaching that Jesus is God predates the New Testament (as shown in the ancient creeds), and is best explained by attributing the source of this doctrine to Jesus Himself. It must be remembered that the apostles were not liars. They were sincere enough about their beliefs to die for them, and they recorded unambiguous statements made by Christ attributing deity to Himself.

The deity of Christ is not a legend. Jesus claimed to be God incarnate. Hence, one cannot consider Him to be simply a great man; for no mere man claims to be God. If Jesus is not God, then He was either a liar or insane. There are no other options.

JESUS WAS NOT A LIAR

The absurd idea that Jesus was a liar who claimed to be God can be easily refuted. For Christ is considered, even by many who reject His claim to deity, to have taught the highest standard of morality known to man. His teachings have motivated such actions as the abolition of slavery, government by the consent of the people, the modern hospital system, education for all children, and charitable programs for the needy. A liar could not have possibly encouraged these movements.

Christ has had a positive impact on mankind like no other person. It is extremely unlikely that so much good could come from a deceiver who led people astray by claiming to be God. The eyewitness accounts of the apostles display the tremendous love Christ had for people. It is not possible that a self-centered and egotistical liar could express genuine affection for his fellow man like that expressed by Christ. The question can also be asked, “Would a liar die for his lie?” It is doubtful that Jesus would lie and then suffer death by crucifixion as a consequence.

It has already been shown that the resurrection of Jesus was a historical event and not a hoax. But, why would God raise a blaspheming liar from the dead? Christ offered His resurrection as proof for His claims to deity (John 2:18-21; Matthew 12:38-40). Therefore, His resurrection proves the validity of His claims to be God. He claimed to be God and then proved it by doing what no mere man could do—He rose from the dead.

JESUS WAS NOT INSANE

Christ’s claims to deity have been shown not to be legends or lies, but the possibility remains that Jesus may have been insane. Could it be that Jesus claimed to be God because He was mentally disturbed?

Often, people compare Jesus of Nazareth with other respected religious leaders. However, very few of these leaders (if any) claimed to be God in a unique sense. Some have claimed to be God, but then teach that we are all God. Jesus claimed to be God in a sense that no other man could claim to be God. Usually, when a religious leader makes a claim as bold as this, it is evidence that he is unbalanced. Charles Manson and David Koresh are two examples of this type of religious leader. The evidence for their instability is obvious. However, this is not so in the case of Jesus. He made bold claims to deity, but also backed these claims by the life He lived and the things He did.

Declaring Christ to be insane is not a common view. Nearly everyone admits that He was a great teacher, even if they reject His deity. However, insane people make lousy teachers. The teachings of Christ are not the teachings of a mad man. They are the greatest teachings ever taught by a man, and this man claimed to be God incarnate.

The miraculous life of Christ is also evidence that He was not insane. Christ gave evidence for His bold claims through His supernatural works. The apostles were eyewitnesses of these miracles. Even the enemies of Christ, the Jewish religious leaders of His day, did not deny His miracles. Instead, they stated in their Talmud that Jesus “practiced sorcery.”9 Though they rejected Jesus’ message, they were forced to admit that He did supernatural works. However, the powerful influence for good that Christ has had upon mankind declares His miracles to be from God and not from Satan. Therefore, Jesus’ miracles show that He was not insane. They provide strong evidence to support His claim to be God.

Another piece of evidence that shows Christ was not insane is the fact that His life and works were prophesied hundreds of years before His birth. A small fraction of the prophecies He fulfilled are listed below:

  1. He was a descendant of Abraham (Genesis 12:1-3; fulfilled in Matthew 1:1-2 and Luke 3:34)
  2. He was from the tribe of Judah (Genesis 49:10; fulfilled in Matthew 1:3 and Luke 3:33)
  3. He was a descendant of Jesse (Isaiah 11:1; fulfilled in Matthew 1:5-6 and Luke 3:32)
  4. He was a descendant of David (Jeremiah 23:5; fulfilled in Matthew 1:1, 6 and Luke 3:31)
  5. He was born to a virgin (Isaiah 7:14; fulfilled in Matthew 1:18-25 and Luke 1:34-35)
  6. He was born in Bethlehem (Micah 5:2; fulfilled in Matthew 2:1 and Luke 2:1-7)
  7. His birth announced by a star (Numbers 24:7; fulfilled in Matthew 2:1-2)
  8. His forerunner (Isaiah 40:3; fulfilled in Matthew 3:1-3 and Mark 1:2-4)
  9. The specific time of His first coming (Daniel 9:24-27 predicts that the Messiah would be executed before the temple would be destroyed. The destruction of the temple occurred in 70AD. Matthew 27:1-2, 26 states that Jesus was crucified when Pilate was governor of Judea. Pilate reigned as governor in Judea from 26AD to 36AD.)
  10. His miracles (Isaiah 35:4-6; fulfilled in Matthew 11:1-6)
  11. His parables (Psalm 78:2; fulfilled in Matthew 13:3)
  12. He was rejected by the Jews (Isaiah 53; fulfilled in Matthew 23:37; 27:22-25; Romans 10:1-3; 11:25)
  13. He received a wide Gentile following (Isaiah 42:1-4; fulfilled in Romans 9:30-33; 11:11 and confirmed in the history of the church)
  14. He was betrayed for 30 pieces of silver (Zechariah 11:12-13; fulfilled in Matthew 26:14-16)
  15. He was forsaken by His disciples (Zechariah 13:7; fulfilled in Matthew 26:56)
  16. He entered Jerusalem on a donkey while receiving a king’s welcome (Zechariah 9:9; fulfilled in Matthew 21:1-11)
  17. He was silent before His accusers (Isaiah 53:7; fulfilled in Matthew 26:63; 27:14)
  18. He was crucified (Psalm 22:16; fulfilled in Matthew 27:35)
  19. Soldiers cast lots for His garments (Psalm 22:18; fulfilled in Matthew 27:35)
  20. His bones were not broken (Psalm 34:20; fulfilled in John 19:31-34)
  21. His side was pierced (Zechariah 12:10; fulfilled in John 19:34)
  22. He was buried in a rich man’s tomb (Isaiah 53:9; fulfilled in Matthew 27:57-60)
  23. His resurrection from the dead (Psalm 16:10; fulfilled in Matthew 28:1-9)
  24. His ascension (Psalm 68:18; fulfilled in Acts 1:9-11)
  25. His position at the Father’s right hand (Psalm 110:1; fulfilled in Hebrews 1:3)

As was noted earlier, these are just a few of the many prophecies that were fulfilled by Christ.10 Even liberal scholars admit that these prophecies were recorded hundreds of years before Christ’s birth. Although they deny the traditional early dates of the Old Testament books, it is almost universally accepted that the Septuagint (the Greek translation of the Hebrew Old Testament) was completed two hundred years before Christ was born.11

Most liberals do not consider some of the prophecies listed above as having been fulfilled by Christ. This is because these liberals a priori deny the possibility of miracles. Since they deny Christ’s resurrection, they also deny that Christ fulfilled the Old Testament prophecy of the resurrection. Even if one removes the Old Testament predictions concerning the supernatural aspects of Christ’s life, one is still left with the evidence from the fulfillment of prophecies of the non-supernatural aspects of Christ’s life. Norman Geisler has noted that the chances of Christ fulfilling just sixteen of these prophecies by mere coincidence are 1 in 1045 (a one with forty-five zeroes after it).12

In fact, three of these Old Testament predictions concerning the Messiah—Daniel 9:26; Isaiah 42:4; Isaiah 53—are enough to prove that only Jesus of Nazareth meets the messianic qualifications. Daniel 9:26 stated that the Messiah would be executed before the destruction of the temple (which occurred in 70AD). Isaiah 42:4 teaches that the Gentile nations would expectantly await Christ’s law. Isaiah 53 declares that the Jews would reject their Messiah. Jesus of Nazareth is the only person in history who has fulfilled all three of these prophecies. He claimed to be the Jewish Messiah and was crucified around 30AD (forty years before the temple was destroyed), the Jews rejected Him, and He received a wide Gentile following.

The life of an insane man would not be prophesied. It is also unlikely that these predictions would refer to an insane man as the Messiah (God’s anointed one) and “the mighty God” (Isaiah 9:6). More than 200 years before Jesus’ birth, His life and works were predicted. He fulfilled these prophecies and performed many miracles. It is absurd for someone to call Jesus insane. To accept His claims is the only reasonable response.

The historical evidence shows that Jesus claimed to be God and proved it by raising Himself from the dead. History shows these claims are not legends, and that He was not a liar, insane, or merely a great man. Therefore, Jesus of Nazareth is God.

THEREFORE, JESUS IS GOD

The following ancient creed was formulated and proclaimed by the first generation church. It declares Jesus to be God and Savior, and instructs all creation to surrender to His Lordship:

Have this attitude in yourselves which was also in Christ Jesus, who, although He existed in the form of God, did not regard equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a bond-servant, and being made in the likeness of men. And being found in appearance as a man, He humbled Himself by becoming obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross. Therefore also God highly exalted Him, and bestowed on Him the name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those who are in heaven, and on earth, and under the earth, and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father (Philippians 2:5-11).

This ancient creed states that the day will come when all creation will bow down before Christ and confess that He is Lord. One can bow to Jesus now, or one can bow to Jesus later, but, the fact remains, that the day will come when all will bow before Christ, both the saved and the unsaved. The saved will bow before Jesus to worship Him as their Savior and King. The lost will bow before Him, due to their fear of His power and authority.

ENDNOTES

1 Mohandas K. Gandhi, Mahatma Gandhi Autobiography (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1948), 170.

2 John Hick, The Center of Christianity (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1968), 27-28.

3 Michael J. Wilkins and J. P. Moreland, eds., Jesus Under Fire (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1995), 154.

4 The World Book Encyclopedia vol. 11, (Chicago: World Book, Inc., 1985), 82.

5 Moreland, Scaling the Secular City, 148-149.

6 J. Dwight Pentecost, The Words and Works of Jesus Christ (Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1981), 288.

7 Merrill C. Tenney, John, the Gospel of Belief (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1948), 150.

8 Merrill F. Unger, Unger’s Bible Handbook (Chicago: Moody Press, 1966), 555.

9 Habermas, Ancient Evidence for the Life of Jesus, 98.

10 For a fuller treatment of Old Testament prophecies fulfilled by Christ, see: Josh McDowell, 141-177.

11 Ibid.,144.

12 Geisler, Apologetics, 343.


May 25 1997

Gordon Clark

Gabe Ginorio

by Dr. Phil Fernandes
A chapter from his doctoral dissertation
© 1997, Institute of Biblical Defense, All Rights Reserved

Gordon Haddon Clark (1902-1985) was the Chairman of the Philosophy Department at Butler University for 28 years. 1 He and Cornelius Van Til were the two greatest proponents of the presuppositional method of apologetics. In this chapter, Clark’s apologetic views will be examined, and the strengths and weaknesses of these views will be discussed.

CLARK’S REJECTION OF TRADITIONAL APOLOGETICS

Gordon Clark rejected the idea that unaided human reason could arrive at truths about God. Due to this fact, he rejected traditional apologetics. Clark stated that “The cosmological argument for the existence of God, most fully developed by Thomas Aquinas, is a fallacy. It is not possible to begin with sensory experience and proceed by the formal laws of logic to God’s existence as a conclusion.” 2 After listing several reasons why he rejected the Thomistic arguments for God’s existence, Clark added that even if the arguments were valid, they would only prove the existence of a lesser god. They would not prove the existence of the true God of the Bible. 3

Clark not only despised the use of philosophical arguments to provide evidence for God’s existence, but he also deplored the utilization of historical evidences in defense of Christianity. Clark reminded his readers that the facts of history do not come with their own built-in interpretation. He states that “Significance, interpretation, evaluation is not given in any fact; it is an intellectual judgment based on some non-sensory criterion.” 4

Clark declared that while the conclusions of science constantly change, Scriptural truth remains the same. 5 Therefore, believers should not rely on observable facts to prove Christianity. Instead, Christians must presuppose the truth of God’s Word and allow revelation to interpret the facts of history for them. 6

The reason behind Clark’s distaste for traditional apologetics was his belief that unaided human reason could never discover any truth, religious or secular. This, Clark believed, should convince one of his need to presuppose the truth of the Christian revelation. 7 Without this presupposition, man cannot find truth. Clark emphasized this point at the conclusion of his textbook on the history of philosophy. He stated, “Does this mean that philosophers and cultural epochs are nothing but children who pay their fare to take another ride on the merry-go-round? Is this Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence? Or, could it be that a choice must be made between skeptical futility and a word from God?” 8

CLARK’S REJECTION OF EMPIRICISM

Empiricism is the attempt to find truth through the five senses. This school of thought believes “that all knowledge begins in sense experience.” 9

According to Clark, Thomas Aquinas was an empiricist. Aquinas believed that “all knowledge must be abstracted out of our sensations.” 10 Aquinas believed that each person begins life with his mind as a blank slate. He held that “everything that is in the mind was first in the senses, except the mind itself.” 11 Although Aquinas believed that God created man’s mind with the innate ability to know things and draw rational conclusions from sense data, Clark does not seem to do justice to this aspect of Aquinas’ thought. 12 Instead, he merely attacks the idea that man could argue from sense data to the existence of God.

Clark turns next to William Paley. Paley argued from the evidence of design in the universe to the existence of an intelligent God as its Cause. Therefore, he, like Aquinas, began with sense experience and then argued to the existence of God. Clark agreed with the criticisms made by David Hume concerning the teleological argument (the argument for God’s existence from design). Hume stated that experience cannot determine if there was one God or several gods who designed the world. Second, since the physical world is finite, nothing in man’s experience tells him that its designer must be infinite. And third, since human experience includes such things as natural disasters, might not the world’s designer be an evil being? 13

Clark pointed out that Hume himself was an empiricist. But Hume was consistent in his thinking. Therefore, he realized that the principle of cause and effect, the existence of external bodies, and the reality of internal selves could not be proven through sense data alone. Therefore, Hume admitted that his empiricism inevitably led to skepticism. 14

Clark emphasized the point that there is a wide gap between basic sense experience and the propositional conclusions made by empiricists. 15 Sense data (the facts of experience) do not come with their own built-in interpretation. Rational conclusions cannot come from sense experience alone. Empiricism, therefore, fails as a truth-finding method. Next, Gordon Clark turned his attention to rationalism.

CLARK’S REJECTION OF RATIONALISM

Rationalism is the attempt to find truth through reason alone. Though Clark admitted that Augustine was not a pure rationalist, he discussed his views of reason. 16 At a time when Greek philosophy was dominated by skepticism, which argued against the possibility of attaining knowledge, Augustine attempted to find a base for knowledge that could not be denied. 17 Augustine declared that “the skeptic must exist in order to doubt his own existence.” 18 Augustine therefore reasoned that even the skeptic should be certain of his existence. Augustine also showed that skeptics could not live like knowledge was impossible. 18

Augustine also held that the laws of logic were universal, eternal, and unchanging truths. Since the human mind is limited and changing, it could not be the ultimate source of these eternal truths.

Hence, there must be an eternal and unchanging Mind as their source. Obviously, this eternal Mind is God. 19

Clark critiqued the views of Anselm. Anselm was even more rationalistic in his thought than Augustine. He believed that the existence of God could be proven through reason alone. Anselm referred to God as the greatest conceivable Being. Therefore, if God does not exist, then one could conceive of a being greater than Him, a being that has the same attributes but does exist. But then this would be the greatest conceivable Being. Therefore, God (the greatest conceivable Being) must necessarily exist. 20 This is called the ontological argument for God’s existence.

Clark wrote that Rene Descartes, also a rationalist, viewed sensation and experience as very deceptive. He attempted to find a single point of certainty by doubting everything until he found something he could not doubt. Through this process, he realized that the more he doubted, the more certain he became of the existence of himself, the doubter. 21

Descartes borrowed Anselm’s ontological argument for God’s existence. Clark stated Descartes’ version of this argument as follows: “God, by definition, is the being who possesses all perfections; existence is a perfection; therefore God exists.” 22

Clark related that Spinoza also used the ontological argument for God’s existence. But Spinoza’s version of the argument did not conclude with the God of the Bible. Instead he “proved” the existence of a god who is the universe (the god of pantheism). 23 However, this raised questions as to rationalism’s claim to prove the existence of God with certainty. For Spinoza’s god and Descartes’ God cannot both exist. Spinoza was also more consistent in his rationalism than was Descartes. Spinoza realized that if all knowledge could be found through reason alone, then supernatural revelation was without value. 24

Gordon Clark listed several problems with rationalism in his writings. He stated that rationalism has historically led to several contradictory conclusions (theism, pantheism, and atheism). 25 Also, Clark stated that “rationalism does not produce first principles out of something else: The first principles are innate . . . Every philosophy must have its first principles . . . Thus a presuppositionless description is impossible.” 26 Although Clark made much use of reason in his own defense of the faith, he presupposed his first principles. He contended that without doing this, reason can never get off the ground. 27

CLARK’S REJECTION OF IRRATIONALISM

In discussing the history of philosophy, Clark states that “Hume had reduced empiricism to skepticism.” 28 Immanuel Kant’s views left man with a knowledge of “things-as-they-appear-to-us,” but with no real knowledge of “things-in-themselves.” 29 Clark emphasized this point with the following words: “In his view the uninformed sense data are entirely incoherent. Order is introduced into them by the mind alone, and what the real world might be like remains unknowable. The whole Postkantian development from Jacobi to Hegel convicts Kant of skepticism.” 30

Clark added that though Hegel effectively critiqued Kant, Hegelianism also failed to justify knowledge. 31 In Hegel’s theory of the unfolding of history, truth was seen as relative. What was true yesterday is not necessarily true today. 32 In short, the greatest minds the world has ever known have failed to escape skepticism. The philosophy of man cannot even prove that man can know anything. Empiricism and rationalism have both failed. This has caused some thinkers to accept irrationalism as the method of finding meaning to life. One such thinker was Soren Kierkegaard.

Kierkegaard denied the effectiveness of both reason and sense experience in finding truth. He believed that a man must stop reasoning. Only through a blind leap of faith can man find true meaning in life. An individual’s subjective passion is of more importance than objective truth. Kierkegaard believed that the doctrines of Christianity were absurd and contradictory. Still, he chose to believe against all reason. 33

Clark rejected the irrationalism of Kierkegaard even though it had become so widespread among modern thinkers, both secular and religious. Clark stated of Kierkegaard, “The fatal flaw is his rejection of logic. When once a man commits himself to contradictions, his language, and therefore his recommendations to other people, become meaningless.” 34

As shown above, Gordon Clark rejected empiricism, rationalism, and irrationalism. He taught that they all eventually reduce to skepticism. Man has failed to find truth through these methodologies. Therefore, man, according to Clark, must make a choice between skepticism and a word from God. 35 Clark’s method of finding truth is called presuppositionalism or dogmatism.

CLARK’S VIEW: DOGMATISM

When one finds that Clark saw all of secular philosophy as unable to justify knowledge, one might assume that Clark was himself a skeptic. But this was not the case. Skeptical futility is not the only option left. Clark referred to his view of finding truth as dogmatism. Clark argued that if all other philosophical systems cannot give meaning to life, then dogmatism is worth a try. Clark recommended that one dogmatically presuppose the truth of the teachings of Scripture. 36

Clark’s view may seem to some to be fideism. But this is not so (according to Clark). For everyone, no matter what their philosophical system may be, must presuppose something. 37 The rationalist must presuppose his first principles. Otherwise, he must look for reasons for everything. This would result in an infinite regress, and there would be no real base for knowledge. 38

The empiricist must assume certain concepts which he cannot prove through sense experience. Such concepts as time, space, equality, causality, and motion are not derived from sense experience. They are brought into one’s sense experience in the beginning to aid one in drawing conclusions from the sense data. 39 Logical Positivism is an extreme empirical view. One of its first principles is that truth can only be found through the five senses. However, this first principle refutes itself since it cannot itself be proven through the five senses. 40

Clark argued that since rationalism and empiricism have failed to make life meaningful, Christian presuppositions should be utilized. For Christian presuppositions do give meaning to life. 41 Clark argued that “Christian Theism is self-consistent and that several other philosophies are inconsistent, skeptical, and therefore erroneous.” 42 Clark added that Christianity “gives meaning to life and morality, and that it supports the existence of truth and the possibility of knowledge.” 43

One can see Clark’s point more clearly by examining his critique of Kant. In Kant’s thinking, there existed no order in sense data. Instead the mind introduces this order into the sense data. Therefore, Kant’s view collapses into skepticism since one can only know things-as-they-appear-to-us and not things-as-they-are. One cannot know the real world. One can only know the world as it appears to him. 44

Clark’s response to Kant’s dilemma is as follows. Clark presupposes the truth of the revelation found in Scripture. Therefore, Clark presupposes that “God has fashioned both the mind and the world so that they harmonize.” 45 If one presupposes the truth of Christianity, then the order that the mind innately reads into the real world is the order which really exists in the real world.

Having discussed Clark’s view of obtaining knowledge, one must now consider how Clark defended Christianity. Clark did this by convincing the nonbeliever that he is contradicting himself. 46 Clark was willing to use logic (the law of noncontradiction) to refute the belief systems of others. He did not feel that he was being inconsistent with his presuppositionalism or dogmatism. For Clark believed that God is Logic. In other words, logic is God-thinking. It flows naturally from God’s Being. 47 In fact, Clark even translated John 1:1 as, “In the beginning was Logic, and Logic was with God, and Logic was God.” 48

The problem with rationalism is that it lacks sufficient first principles. But, according to Clark, once one presupposes the truth of the Bible, one can use reason to tear down the views of others. Clark spoke of reason in the following manner:

Therefore I wish to suggest that we neither abandon reason nor use it unaided; but on pain of skepticism acknowledge a verbal, propositional revelation of fixed truth from God. Only by accepting rationally comprehensible information on God’s authority can we hope to have a sound philosophy and a true religion. 49

Clark not only defended the faith by tearing down other belief systems through use of the law of contradiction, but he (after presupposing the truth of Christianity) also was willing to confirm the truth of Christianity in two ways. First, Clark showed that it alone is self-consistent. And second, he appealed to its ability to provide man with meaning to life, moral values, and the genuine possibility of attaining true knowledge. 50 Since all other philosophies have failed to obtain knowledge, one must choose between skepticism and presupposing Christian revelation. 51

Still, Clark seemed to revert back to fideism. This was due to his hyper-Calvinistic theology. He firmly believed that one really cannot convince another of the truth of Christianity, for God alone sovereignly bestows faith upon an individual. 52 When answering the question of why one person presupposes the Bible to be true and not the Muslim Koran, he simply replied that “God causes the one to believe.” 53

CLARK’S SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

In his writings, Gordon Clark attempted to answer the question,

“How can the existence of God be harmonized with the existence of evil?” 54 If God is all-good, He would want to destroy evil. If God is all-powerful, He is able to destroy evil. But evil still exists. It seems that God cannot be both all-good and all-powerful. However, Christianity teaches that He is both. This is the problem of evil. 55

Zoroastrianism attempts to resolve the problem by teaching that there are two gods. One is good while the other is evil. Neither of the two gods is infinite since they have both failed to destroy the opposing god. Plato’s views also result in an unresolved dualism. In his thought, God is not the creator of all things. There exists eternal and chaotic space which the Demiurge cannot control. 56

According to Clark, even Augustine’s answer to the dilemma was inadequate. Clark stated that Augustine taught that evil is metaphysically unreal. It does not exist. Therefore, all that God created is good since evil is non-being. 57 (Whether or not Clark treated Augustine’s view fairly will be discussed at a later point in this chapter.)

Clark pointed out that Augustine added to his response the doctrine of human free will. Though God is all-powerful, He has sovereignly chosen to give mankind free will. God allows man to make his own choices. Mankind has chosen evil. Therefore, all that God created is good. Evil can be blamed not on God, but on the abuse of free will by man. 58

But Clark rejected this view of free will. Clark believed that the Bible does not teach that man is free to choose that which is right as opposed to that which is wrong. Clark stated that “free will is not only futile, but false. Certainly, if the Bible is the Word of God, free will is false; for the Bible consistently denies free will.” 59

Though Clark rejected the doctrine of free will, he believed man has free agency. “Free will means there is no determining factor operating on the will, not even God. Free will means that either of two incompatible actions are equally possible.” 60 This Clark rejected. On the other hand, “Free agency goes with the view that all choices are inevitable. The liberty that the Westminster Confession ascribes to the will is a liberty from compulsion, coaction, or force of inanimate objects; it is not a liberty from the power of God.” 61 Clark argued that a man can still be responsible for his actions even without the freedom to do other than he has done. Clark stated that, “a man is responsible if he must answer for what he does . . . a person is responsible if he can be justly rewarded or punished for his deeds. This implies, of course, that he must be answerable to someone.” 62

Clark then asked the question, “Is it just then for God to punish a man for deeds that God Himself ‘determined before to be done?’” 63 He answered in the affirmative. He stated that, “Whatever God does is just.” 64 Man is responsible to God; but God is responsible to no one.

Clark openly admitted that his view makes God the cause of sin. For, in his thinking, “God is the sole ultimate cause of everything.” 65 But, while God is the ultimate cause of sin, He is not the author of sin. The author is the immediate cause of an action. Man is the immediate cause of his sin. But he was not free to do otherwise. For God is the ultimate cause of sin. 66

Clark stated that, “God’s causing a man to sin is not sin. There is no law, superior to God, which forbids him to decree sinful acts. Sin presupposes a law, for sin is lawlessness.” 67 Clark explained that “God is above law” because “the laws that God imposes on men do not apply to the divine nature.” 68

Clark stated:

Man is responsible because God calls him to account; man is responsible because the supreme power can punish him for disobedience. God, on the contrary, cannot be responsible for the plain reason that there is no power superior to him; no greater being can hold him accountable; no one can punish him; there is no one to whom God is responsible; there are no laws which he could disobey.

The sinner therefore, and not God, is responsible; the sinner alone is the author of sin. Man has no free will, for salvation is purely of grace; and God is sovereign. 69

This was Clark’s proposed solution to the problem of evil. God is in fact the ultimate cause of sin. But He is not evil, for He committed no sin. And He is not responsible for sin, for there is no one to whom He is responsible. God is just, for whatever He does is just. Therefore, the creature has no right to stand in judgment over his Creator.

STRENGTHS OF CLARK’S PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

Gordon Clark, as this study shows, was a very original thinker. Even if one disagrees with much of what he has written, he has made a tremendous contribution to Christian thought that should not be overlooked. There are several strengths which are evident in the thought of Gordon Clark.

His rejection of pure rationalism. Clark is absolutely correct when he points out the major deficiency of rationalism. That is, rationalism cannot even get started until certain unproven assumptions are made. Reason cannot prove everything. This would result in an infinite regress, and nothing would be proven. First principles must be presupposed. They are not logically necessary (they cannot be proven with rational certainty).

His rejection of pure empiricism. Clark is right when he points out problems with extreme empiricism. Sense data and the facts of history do not come with their own built-in interpretations. They must be interpreted within the context of a person’s world view. Empirical data alone cannot give us rational conclusions.

His rejection of irrationalism. Clark should be commended for his lack of patience for irrationalism. Once a person denies the law of contradiction, then the opposite of whatever that person teaches can be equally true with those teachings. But all human thought and communication comes to a halt if one allows such an absurd premise. A person who holds to irrationalism cannot even express his view without assuming the truth of the law of contradiction.

His knowledge of the history of philosophical thought. Rarely does one read the works of a Christian author who has the insights that Clark had. His knowledge of the thought of the great philosophical minds of the past should encourage all Christians to be more diligent in their own studies. Gordon Clark was a man who had something to say because he was a man who lived a disciplined life of study. Even if one disagrees with the thrust of Clark’s thought, one must never dismiss the insights he shared with others concerning the history of philosophy.

His recognition of the fact that all people have hidden presuppositions. Too often Christians pretend that they have no biases whatsoever, but this is not the case. Every person, believer and nonbeliever alike, has presuppositions that are often hidden. Clark was right in his view that apologetics is more accurately the seeking of confirmation for our presuppositions than it is the unbiased search for truth.

His use of the law of noncontradiction. Clark was justified in his usage of the law of noncontradiction. If two opposite concepts can both be true at the same time and in the same sense, then all knowledge and communication become impossible. Any world view that either is a contradiction or generates contradictions is not worth believing.

He is very consistent in his Calvinism. Too often Christians claim to be Calvinists but actually deny or redefine several of the five main points of Calvinism. Clark is not only a strong defender of all five points, but he also consistently holds to the implications of these points. His rejection of human free will and his view of God as the ultimate cause of evil are unpopular concepts, even among Calvinists. Clark is to be credited with having the courage to believe that which is consistent with his system of thought.

He is right to seek confirmation for his Christian presuppositions. Many presuppositionalists are content in merely assuming the truth of Christianity. But Clark realizes that, after pre-supposing biblical truth, one must still seek justification for this assumption. Clark does this by showing that Christianity does what all secular philosophies have failed to do. They failed to give meaning to life, justify moral values, and find truth.

He is right that man must choose. Clark recognizes that since all secular philosophies have failed to justify their truth claims, man must make a choice. A person can choose to continue to live with contradictory views. Or a person can choose skepticism and suspend all judgment (except his judgment to be skeptical). Clark even remarks that, for some, suicide is their choice. 70 But Clark pleads with his readers to choose Christianity. If secular philosophies have failed to find truth and give meaning to life, then why not choose Christianity? Whatever the case, man must choose.

THE WEAKNESSES OF CLARK’S PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

His denial of the basic reliability of sense perception. Though Clark is correct when he states that concepts such as moral values, causality, time, and space cannot be derived from sense data alone, he goes too far when he speaks of the “futility of sensation.” 71 With Clark’s distrust for sense experience, how can he presuppose the truth of the Bible? For he must first use his sense of sight to read the Bible to find out what it is he is going to presuppose. In fact, the Bible itself seems to teach the basic reliability of sense perception. The Mosaic Law places great emphasis on eyewitness testimony, and the eyewitness accounts of Christ’s post-resurrection appearances are presented as evidence for the truth of Christ’s claims.

His denial of Thomistic first principles. While refuting rationalism, Clark stated that it needed first principles. For justification must stop somewhere. He pointed out that since first principles could not be proven through reason alone, rationalism fails to find truth without appealing to something other than reason. The first principles are not logically necessary. In this he is correct. However, Clark accepts the law of contradiction (what Thomists call the law of noncontradiction), though he says it is not logically necessary. He points out that if we do not accept this law, all knowledge and communication would cease. However, this is the same type of argument that Aquinas (and Aristotle long before him) used for his remaining first principles. Besides the principle of noncontradiction, Aquinas utilized the principles of identity, excluded middle, causality, and finality. 72 Aristotle and Aquinas argued that these principles “cannot actually be denied without absurdity.” 73 In other words, they are actually undeniable (though not logically necessary). But this is very similar to what Clark claims for one of his first principles, the law of contradiction. If Clark is justified in using this principle, then the other Thomistic first principles of knowledge may likewise be justified. If one accepts the principle of causality (every effect has an adequate cause), then one can reason from the effect (the finite world) to its cause (the infinite Creator). This would deal Clark’s entire system a lethal blow since it would justify the use of traditional arguments for God’s existence. This would eliminate presuppositional apologetics as the only way for a Christian to defend his faith.

His downplaying of historical evidences for the Christian Faith. Clark rightly criticized deriving knowledge from sense data alone. Because of this, he minimized historical evidences. For facts of history, like sense data, do not come with their own built-in interpretations. However, if one accepts Thomistic first principles (because they are actually undeniable), then one can attempt to make sense of the facts of history. If a man claimed to be God and rose from the dead to prove His claim true, then one is not justified in explaining this resurrection in purely naturalistic terms. For every event must have an adequate cause. And no naturalistic explanation has succeeded to account for the resurrection. 74 Only a supernatural cause is sufficient in this case.

He gives no credit to probability arguments. Clark points out that other systems of philosophy do not have a starting point based on certainty. They must presuppose their first principles. However, Clark’s own first principles are also not based on certainty; they too must be presupposed. It seems that Clark is judging his own philosophical system in a more lenient fashion than he does other schools of thought. It is true that Clark finds confirmation for the Christian presupposition that is lacking in other presuppositions. Still, this is after the fact. And, as Clark admits, this confirmation itself only makes Christianity more probable than other views; it does not establish its certainty. It seems that more credit should be given to arguments for first principles based upon a high degree of probability. Why should an argument be rejected when its premises and conclusion are very probable, while opposing views are unlikely?

Other philosophers have settled for less than certainty but still have solid systems of thought. Some might argue from premises that they believe are “beyond all reasonable doubt.” Norman Geisler, following in the tradition of Thomas Aquinas, uses the principle of “actual undeniability.” 75 Some things cannot be denied without contradiction and therefore must be true. For instance, if I deny my existence I must first exist to make the denial. For nothing is nothing. Nothing cannot deny anything. Only an existent being can deny something. Therefore, it is actually undeniable that I exist. 76

Charles Hodge (1797-1878) based his philosophical arguments on what he believed were “self-evident truths.” Though these truths could be denied by others, their denial is “forced and temporary.”

Once a philosopher finishes lecturing or debating, he returns to the real world and no longer denies self-evident truths such as his existence, the existence of others, and the reality of moral values. 77 He can deny moral values in the lecture hall, but once he is at home, he calls the police when he is robbed.

It seems then that Clark is mistaken. Christians can discover truths that are either “self-evident” or “actually undeniable.” They can then dialogue with nonbelievers using these premises as common ground. Clark was wrong not to give proper due to first principles based upon a high degree of probability. This leaves the door open for traditional apologetics.

His attacks on traditional apologetics. Clark’s attack on traditional apologetics is unfounded. This can be shown from his treatment of the Thomistic cosmological argument for God’s existence. Aquinas argued that all existent beings which could possibly not exist need a cause or ground for their continuing in existence. In other words, all dependent existence must rely for its continued existence on a totally independent Being, a Being which is uncaused and self-existent. 78

Clark comments that Aquinas has not ruled out the possibility of an infinite regress of dependent beings. 79 However, Clark is mistaken. For Aquinas is not arguing indefinitely into the past. He is arguing for the current existence of a totally independent Being. Aquinas is arguing for the cause of the continued and present existence of dependent beings, not just the cause for the beginning of their existence. 80 Aquinas is pointing out that if one takes away the independent Being, then there is nothing to sustain the existence of all dependent beings. Every dependent being relies directly on the independent Being for preserving it in existence. The causality is simultaneous, just as a person’s face simultaneously causes the existence of its reflection in a mirror. At the exact moment the person moves his face, the reflection is gone.

Clark raises another objection against the Thomistic cosmological argument. He states that even if the argument is valid, it would not prove the existence of the God of the Bible. Clark seems to imply that unless we prove every attribute of God, then it is not the identical God. 81 However, if Aquinas proves the existence of the Uncaused Cause of all else that exists, how could this possibly not be the God of the Bible? If Clark can refer to God as “Truth” and “Logic” and still be talking about the Triune God of the Bible, then Aquinas can identify God with the “Unmoved Mover.”

Finally, Clark accuses Aquinas of using the word “exist” with two completely different meanings. 82 When Aquinas speaks of God, he speaks of God existing infinitely. But when he speaks of man, he speaks of man existing finitely. God is existence; man merely has existence. Though Clark’s critique may seem valid, it is not. Aquinas would define existence as “that which is” whether it referred to God or man. True, Aquinas would apply the term “existence” to God infinitely, but to man only finitely. Still, the fact remains that whether Aquinas speaks of God or man, the meaning of existence remains the same.

Apparently, Clark misunderstands Aquinas’ view of analogical language. Aquinas taught that we cannot have univocal (totally the same) knowledge of God. Still, our knowledge of God is not equivocal (totally different) since that would be no knowledge at all. Instead, according to Aquinas, our knowledge of God is analogical (similar). By this Aquinas did not mean that the concepts used of God and man have similar meanings. He meant that they have identical meanings, but that they must be applied only in a similar way. All limitations must be removed from a concept before it is applied to God. However, the concept itself continues to have the same meaning throughout. 83

Not only did Clark express distaste for the cosmological argument for God’s existence, he also disliked the teleological argument (the argument from design). 84 He accepted Hume’s criticism of this argument. Hume concluded that it proved the existence only of a finite god or gods, and that this god or gods may be evil (due to the evil in the world). However, if one argues for the existence of one infinite God through the cosmological argument, and then finishes the argument with the teleological premises, the argument from design will add the attribute of intelligence to the Uncaused Cause. The problem of evil could also be dealt with as a separate issue. In short, Clark’s attempt to destroy traditional apologetics has failed.

His failure to refute the Islamic Faith. After destroying secular philosophy through the use of the law of contradiction, Clark does not apply this law to Islam. Instead, he merely states that God causes some to accept the Bible when answering the question, “Why does one man accept the Koran and another the Bible?” 85 Apparently, after all is said and done, Clark’s system relies on God alone to cause the person to believe. One wonders why Clark went to such trouble to refute secular philosophies. Could not the same response be given to them?

His misrepresentation of Augustine and Aquinas. While dealing with the problem of evil, Clark accused Augustine of denying the reality of evil. He stated that Augustine taught that “all existing things are good” and that “evil therefore does not exist—it is metaphysically unreal.” 86 Clark represented Augustine as reasoning that since evil does not exist, God cannot be the cause of evil. 87 In this way, Clark makes it sound as if Augustine is in agreement with the Christian Science view of evil as an illusion. Clark, is misrepresenting Augustine on this point.

Augustine did teach that God created everything that exists and that all that God created is good. However, evil is a perversion of that good brought about by the free choices of rational beings (fallen angels and men). Evil is a privation. It is a lack of a good that should be there. 88 An illustration of this would be rust. God did not create rust. Still it exists, but only as a corruption of something that God created (metal). Therefore, evil is real, but it must exist in some good thing that God created. All that God created is good. God did not create evil. He created the possibility of evil (free will). Fallen rational beings actualized evil by abusing a good thing (free will) God gave them.

Clark also misrepresents Aquinas by implying that Aquinas is a strict empiricist. It is true that Aquinas believed all knowledge comes through sense experience; he taught that God created man’s mind with the innate ability to draw rational conclusions from sense data. Aquinas spoke of both the active mind (this innate ability to arrive at universals from particulars) and the receptive mind (the aspect of the mind which receives data from sense experience). Clark seems to view Aquinas as only holding to the existence of the receptive mind. He chooses to ignore Aquinas’ teaching about the active mind (also called the agent intellect). 89

His proposed solution to the problem of evil. Clark’s answer to the problem of evil is inadequate. He stated that God is not responsible for evil simply because there is no one above Him to whom He is responsible. Since Clark denied human free will (man could not choose to do otherwise), Clark made God the ultimate cause of evil.

The Augustinian approach, in the opinion of many Christian philosophers, is to be preferred. Augustine held that God gave man the freedom to disobey His commands. Therefore, God permitted sin; it was not part of His perfect will for man. A free will theodicy (attempting to propose a reason why God permitted evil) or a free will defense (attempting to merely show that it is not impossible for an all-good and all-powerful God to coexist with evil) is a much more plausible solution to the problem of evil than the solution Clark proposed. 90 Of course, since Clark denied genuine free will, these options were not open to him.

He does not allow for the use of secular material during evangelism. Clark states, “in evangelistic work there can be no appeal to secular, non-Christian material.” 91 However, this is exactly what the apostle Paul did on Mars Hill. When speaking to Stoic and Epicurean philosophers, he quoted from the writings of two ancient Greek poets to find common ground with his hearers (Acts 17:16-34). If one must choose between the evangelistic approach of Gordon Clark and that of the apostle Paul, then one should choose Paul.

No Christian can show that every non-Christian system of thought is inconsistent. Clark claims that since every non-Christian philosophy has failed, people should presuppose the truth of the Christian world view. However, it is impossible for Clark, or any other person, to thoroughly examine every non-Christian system of thought. 92 Even if it were possible for Clark to expose the contradictions in every non-Christian world view today, there is no guarantee that a totally consistent non-Christian world view will not be produced in the future. 93

CONCLUSION

Clark’s presuppositional approach to apologetics, with minor adaptions, is a worthy apologetic. Uncovering contradictions in non-Christian belief systems is a necessary component in one’s defense of the faith. However, Clark’s presuppositional approach is not the only method Christians can use when defending the faith. Although Clark successfully demolishes several secular philosophies, traditional apologetics survives his assault.

ENDNOTES

1   Gordon H. Clark, Clark Speaks From the Grave (Jefferson: The Trinity Foundation, 1986), 2.

2   Gordon H. Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation (Jefferson: The Trinity Foundation, 1986), 35.

3   Ibid., 37.

4   Clark, Clark Speaks From the Grave, 54.

5   Ibid., 55.

6   Ibid., 57.

7   Geisler, Apologetics, 37.

8   Gordon H. Clark, Thales to Dewey (Jefferson: The Trinity Foundation, 1989), 534.

9   Geisler and Feinberg, 431.

10  Gordon H. Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy (Jefferson: The Trinity Foundation, 1989), 60-61.

11  Geisler, Thomas Aquinas, 86.

12  Ibid.

13  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 64-70.

14  Ibid., 71,76-78.

15  Ibid., 91.

16  Ibid., 27.

17  Ibid., 28-29.

18  Ibid., 31.

19  Ibid., 32.

20  Ibid., 33-35.

21  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 50-51.

22  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 35.

23  Clark, Thales to Dewey, 332.

24  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 53.

25  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 56.

26  Ibid., 117-118.

27  Ibid., 120.

28  Ibid., 93.

29  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 62.

30  Gordon H. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things (Jefferson: The Trinity Foundation, 1991), 315-316.

31  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 63-68.

32  Ibid., 98.

33  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 101-105.

34  Ibid., 114.

35  Clark, Thales to Dewey, 534.

36  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 116.

37  Ibid., 118.

38  Ibid., 51-52.

39  Ibid., 70-91.

40  Ibid., 118-119.

41  Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 324.

42  Ibid.

43  Ibid.

44  Ibid., 315-316.

45  Ibid., 316.

46  Clark, Three Types of religious Philosophy, 140-142.

47  Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley, 76.

48  Ibid.

49  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 87.

50  Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 324.

51  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 109-110.

52  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 138.

53  Ibid., 139.

54  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 195.

55  Ibid.

56  Ibid., 195-196.

57  Ibid., 196.

58  Ibid., 199.

59  Ibid., 206.

60  Ibid., 227.

61  Ibid.

62  Ibid., 231.

63  Ibid.

64  Ibid., 232-233.

65  Ibid., 237-238.

66  Ibid., 237-239.

67  Ibid., 239-240.

68  Ibid., 240.

69  Ibid., 241.

70  Clark, Thales to Dewey, 534.

71  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 91.

72  Geisler, Thomas Aquinas, 72-74.

73  Ibid., 78-79.

74  Habermas, 26-33.

75  Geisler, Christian Apologetics, 143.

76  Ibid., 143-144.

77  Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1989), vol. 1, 210.

78  Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a. 2,3.

79  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 36-37.

80  Craig, Apologetics, 63-65.

81  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 37-38.

82  Ibid., 38-39.

83  Geisler, Thomas Aquinas, 40.

84  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 64-70.

85  Ibid., 139.

86  Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation, 196.

87  Ibid.

88  Augustine, The City of God, 22.1.

89  Geisler, Thomas Aquinas, 86.

90  Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974), 28-31.

91  Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 139.

92  Gordon R. Lewis, 119.

93  Ibid., 119-120.


May 25 1997

Cornelius Van Til

Gabe Ginorio

by Dr. Phil Fernandes
A chapter from his doctoral dissertation
© 1997, Institute of Biblical Defense, All Rights Reserved

Clark’s presuppositionalism could be called dogmatic presuppositionalism, 1 whereas Van Til utilized what could be called transcendental presuppositionalism. 2 Still, their thought systems had much in common.

REJECTION OF TRADITIONAL APOLOGETICS

Like Clark, Van Til was opposed to traditional methods of apologetics. Van Til taught that because of man’s Fall in the garden “every one of fallen man’s functions operates wrongly.” 3 Van Til stated that “on account of sin man is blind with respect to truth wherever truth appears.” 4 Van Til taught that without the correct view about God, man cannot have the correct view of himself and the world. 5

According to Van Til, the unsaved man is biased against God; he presupposes his own autonomy. 6 The unsaved man believes he can start with himself and find truth without aid from God. There is therefore no neutral ground between believers and nonbelievers. 7 The nonbeliever presupposes human autonomy; the believer presupposes the existence of God.

However, there is common ground: all mankind must live within God’s universe. 8 All men live in the real world of reason and moral values. Because of this common ground, believers can reason with nonbelievers. Still, with the absence of neutral ground, traditional apologetics cannot even get started. People are not unbiased observers who allow the facts to determine their world view. Instead, people interpret the facts by their preconceived world view (their presuppositions or biases). 9 Therefore, all apologetics must be by way of presupposition. 10

Van Til disagrees with Roman Catholicism for declaring the autonomy of human reason. Roman Catholicism “ascribes ultimacy or self-sufficiency to the mind of man.” 11 When Arminians, Evangelicals, and “less consistent” Calvinists defend the faith, they take the side of the Roman Church by assuming the mind of the unsaved man can of itself rise to a proper understanding of the Triune God. 12 Only a consistent Calvinistic position rightly denies the nonbeliever the ability to reason correctly (without faulty biases).

Van Til adds that traditional apologetics would never prove the existence of the Triune God of the Bible. Instead, traditional apologetics only proves the existence of a finite god. 13 Van Til states that Roman Catholicism would never desire to prove the existence of an infinite God who controls whatever comes to pass. The Roman Church, according to Van Til, wants to protect man’s self-sufficiency. 14

Van Til believed the root of the problem is found in the fact that all nonbelievers suppress their knowledge of the true God (Romans 1:18-22). Concerning the unsaved man, Van Til states that “deep down in his mind every man knows that he is a creature of God and responsible to God. Every man, at bottom, knows that he is a covenant-breaker. But every man acts as though this were not so.” 15 By using traditional apologetics, believers mistakenly assume that the unsaved man honestly needs proof that the God of the Bible exists. Instead, Christians should directly confront the nonbeliever by proclaiming the gospel message from the start. 16

According to Van Til, traditional arguments are also misguided in that they use inductive arguments for Christianity. Inductive arguments are probabilistic; they do not prove their conclusions with certainty. Therefore, traditional arguments give nonbelievers an excuse for rejecting the truth of Christianity. For if Christianity is only probably true, then it is also possibly false. Van Til believed that what was needed was not a probabilistic argument for Christianity, but an argument that proved the impossibility of the contrary. Van Til believed that his transcendental argument alone proved Christianity to be true with certainty. 17

The traditional arguments for God’s existence are therefore useless. The nonbeliever must be confronted with the gospel. Only in this direct approach will the believer find a point of contact with the nonbeliever. It should not be assumed that the nonbeliever is an honest, neutral seeker of truth. 18

REASONING BY PRESUPPOSITION

After rejecting traditional apologetics, Van Til unveils his own method of defending the faith. He states that “a truly Protestant apologetic must therefore make its beginning from the presupposition that the Triune God . . . speaks to him with absolute authority in Scripture.” 19 Now that believers stand on Christian foundations, they can see “the futility of reasoning on non-Christian foundations . . .” 20 Thus, rather than argue to the existence of the Triune God who has spoken to man through His Word, apologists must presuppose His existence.

Van Til sees no middle ground at this point. Two opposing presuppositions are competing for a person’s allegiance. The nonbeliever presupposes that he himself is the final or ultimate reference point in all human thought, but the believer rightly presupposes the final or ultimate reference point in human thought to be the Triune God who speaks to man through His infallible Word. 21 There is no neutral ground here.

If humans were really products of chance as the nonbeliever assumes is the case, then there would be no possibility of knowing the world, ourselves, or anything else. 22 But human thought and knowledge is possible because man is who the Bible declares him to be, a being created by God. 23

Van Til does engage in refuting the beliefs of others. For the sake of argument, believers may “place themselves with the unbeliever on his presupposition” in order to expose the contradictions which the nonbeliever holds. 24 However, even the law of noncontradiction is not presupposed by the Christian. It is only borrowed from the nonbeliever’s system of thought and used by the Christian to show the internal inconsistencies of the anti-Christian thought.

In Van Til’s apologetic system, only the “Triune God revealed in Scripture” is presupposed. 25 Not even nature or the laws of logic are presupposed. For man to start with himself rather than with God would be to deny his utter dependence on God. One cannot argue for Christianity. Instead, the validity of the gospel must be presupposed. However, Van Til will allow believers to utilize the presuppositions of nonbelievers in order to refute their views.

CIRCULAR REASONING

Cornelius Van Til stated that “all reasoning is, in the nature of the case, circular reasoning.” 26 By this he meant that “the starting-point, the method, and the conclusion are always involved in one another.” 27 In other words, when attempting to prove something, a person must first assume the conclusion to be true before proving it to be true. Van Til was claiming that every argument contains its conclusion in its initial premise.

Philosophers refer to circular reasoning as “begging the question.” It has long been considered an informal fallacy by logicians. To assume what you are attempting to prove has historically been considered to be an illegitimate form of argumentation. Most believers and nonbelievers agree on this point.

It is interesting that Van Til chooses to refer to “all reasoning” as circular. The point he is stressing is that we argue from our presuppositions, not to them. 28 Apart from regeneration by the Holy Spirit, a person will not presuppose the truth of Christianity. 29 Here, Van Til’s Calvinism is evident.

PARADOX

Van Til does not believe that the law of contradiction can be found in God’s being. 30 Whereas Gordon Clark viewed this law as an expression of God’s very being, Van Til considers this law a human limitation that does not apply to God. He believed that Clark, and those who agree with him, make God subject to a human law. Van Til warns that the rational man will allow his reason to sit in judgment over God’s Word. He will not allow the Bible to rule his life. 31

Van Til goes so far as to speak of God’s Word as seemingly contradicting itself. Though he states that God does not actually contradict Himself, he adds that God’s communication to man often appears contradictory to finite human minds. 32 But, Van Til cannot have it both ways. Either God cannot contradict Himself and the law of contradiction flows from His nature, or God can contradict Himself and the law is merely a human limitation.

If by paradox Van Til simply means an apparent contradiction, then even Clark would agree with his premise. Therefore, any criticism that Van Til made of Clark on this point would also apply to Van Til himself. However, if his usage of the term paradox does mean an actual contradiction, then nothing could be known of God.

For God could both love mankind and not love mankind at the same time and in the same sense. It seems that Van Til should have withdrawn his criticism of Clark in this area and admitted that the law of contradiction flows naturally from God’s being.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT

Though Van Til rejected traditional apologetics, he was willing to do more than refute the nonbeliever’s world view. Van Til was willing to use one argument for the truth of Christianity. He believed it to be the only valid argument for the true God. He called this argument the transcendental argument.

The transcendental argument attempts to uncover the hidden presuppositions of the nonbeliever. These hidden presuppositions are the necessary preconditions for human thought. 33 Van Til argued that all human thought and moral judgments would be impossible if the Christian God did not exist. Van Til claimed that if God did not exist, then man would know nothing. Even for man to be conscious of his own existence presupposes a consciousness of God’s existence. When a nonbeliever argues against God’s existence, he must first presuppose God’s existence just to argue at all. 34

For the sake of argument, a believer can place himself within the unbeliever’s world view to show that the unbeliever has to presuppose the truth of Christianity just to raise an objection against Christianity. 35 Only Christianity justifies man’s ability to reason. Only Christianity gives meaning to life. All other world views lead to irrationality and chaos. 36 In fact, scientific induction makes no sense in a universe without God. For, only the Christian God guarantees the uniformity and order of nature necessary for scientists to argue from the particulars of nature to general conclusions about the world in which he lives. 37

COMPARISON WITH GORDON CLARK

When comparing the thought of Cornelius Van Til with that of Gordon Clark, one finds several points of agreement as well as several areas of disagreement. First, some points of agreement between these two men will be examined.

Both were serious and consistent Calvinists. Because they both believed that no one could freely choose Christ apart from the Holy Spirit’s regenerating work, direct attempts to persuade nonbelievers were thought to be counterproductive.

Both agreed that the gospel should be presupposed and not argued for. Van Til and Clark felt that to defend the truth of the gospel was to deny the Calvinist doctrine of the total depravity of man. They both believed that man’s reason was damaged due to the Fall and that direct argumentation for the truth of Christianity would be useless. Still, both were willing to refute the beliefs of the nonbeliever and provide indirect confirmation for the truth of Christianity.

Both agreed that secular philosophy was a complete failure. Clark taught that all non-Christian philosophy eventually reduced to skepticism. Van Til believed that secular philosophy was futile since human reason was fallen. In his view, without presupposing the God of the Bible, no knowledge was attainable. However, Van Til believed that even nonbelievers presuppose God’s existence (though they suppress this truth) in order to find truth.

Both agreed that traditional apologetics is unbiblical and useless. Throughout their writings, Clark and Van Til belittled the traditional method of defending the faith. They believed that there was no neutral battle ground between the believer and nonbeliever where Christianity could be defended. The gospel was to be presupposed rather than defended. They saw no use for the classical arguments for God’s existence or for traditional usage of historical evidences for the Christian Faith.

Besides these points of agreement between Clark and Van Til, there were areas of disagreement. The following examples will illustrate this.

They disagreed about circular reasoning. Van Til believed that all reasoning is circular. The conclusion of one’s arguments can always be found in one’s premises. However, Clark was more rationalistic in his thinking. He considered circular reasoning a logical fallacy. Because of this, Clark dogmatically presupposed his first principle (the existence of the God of the Bible) and then deduced his beliefs from this first principle.

They disagreed about the status and use of the law of contradiction. Clark believed that the law of contradiction flowed from God’s nature. He taught that God is logic. Therefore, when he presupposed the Triune God who revealed Himself in the Bible, he also presupposed the law of contradiction. He would then use this law to destroy the belief systems of nonbelievers.

Van Til, however, believed this law to be a human limitation which Clark forced upon God. Van Til believed that Clark had subjected God to this law. Though Van Til would use this law to refute other belief systems, it was only because he chose to use the “enemy’s own ammunition to defeat the enemy in battle.” In fact, Clark’s view of the law of noncontradiction is probably what caused the widest gap between the thought of these two men. Clark presupposed the law of noncontradiction when doing apologetics. Van Til refused to do so.

STRENGTHS OF VAN TIL’S SYSTEM

In the presuppositional apologetics of Cornelius Van Til there is much to be commended. The following examples will make this clear.

He stresses the sinfulness of man. Too often, defenders of the faith tend to de-emphasize the effects of the Fall on mankind. But this is not true of Van Til. If Van Til can be accused of any fault in this area, it would be overkill. For, due to his Calvinism, man is not free to accept Christ; regeneration precedes faith.

He stresses man’s suppression of God’s truth. Many apologists assume that the reason why nonbelievers do not come to Christ is merely an intellectual one. Van Til rightly shows that men willfully suppress whatever knowledge of the true God they have. Van Til is correct in his view that the problem is ultimately that of a moral choice rather than an intellectual one. God has proven his existence to all men through His visible creation (Romans 1:18-22). Therefore, man has no excuse for rejecting Him.

He stresses God’s work in salvation. Even non-Calvinists should commend Van Til for his focus on God’s work in salvation. Apart from God’s grace, no man would be saved. Traditional apologists often imply that they can lead people to Christ through argumentation alone. More emphasis is needed on the inward persuasion of the Holy Spirit concerning those to whom apologists witness. God can use traditional argumentation. Still, it is God who does the saving. The apologist can remove intellectual stumbling blocks to the faith, but only God can persuade one to turn to Christ.

He stresses the importance of faith over reason. Van Til emphasizes that one must believe in Christ to be saved. Without Christ, even the wisest man in the world will be eternally lost.

Though traditional apologists are right in that man can reason to the true faith (Van Til disagrees with this), once a person through reason finds the true faith, he must submit his reason to it.

He is willing to tear down the belief systems of those who oppose the gospel and use an indirect argument for Christianity. If it were not for this point, Van Til would probably be classified as a fideist. Though he rejects traditional apologetics (like the fideist), he is willing to refute non-Christian views and give one argument for his beliefs (unlike the fideist). Van Til’s transcendental argument goes beyond refuting non-Christian world views; it presents positive evidence for the Christian faith. Still, it does so in an indirect manner, rather than in the direct fashion found in traditional apologetics.

WEAKNESSES OF VAN TIL’S SYSTEM

Despite the many good things that could be said about Van Til’s apologetics, there are many weaknesses in his thought. A few of these weaknesses are mentioned below.

He denies that man has the ability to test revelation-claims. Given Van Til’s system, there seems to be no way to decide whether the Bible or the Koran is the Word of God. Yet the Bible frequently commands us to test the spirits, the prophets, and the messages they proclaim (1 Jn 4:1; Deut 18:20-22; Mt 7:15-23; Gal 1:8-9). 38 Also, God provided ample evidence for His revelation-claims by performing miracles through His spokesmen and by raising Jesus from the dead (Jn 20:30-31; 1 Cor 15:3-8). It seems that God has given even fallen man the ability to test revelation-claims. Whether or not man uses this ability wisely is another question. Again, Van Til’s Calvinism can be seen. For without regeneration by the Holy Spirit, no one will accept the Bible as God’s Word.

His view that all reasoning is circular. It is true that much of Van Til’s thought is circular. It is not true that all thought is circular. Even though all men have presuppositions, they can be tested just as scientific hypotheses are tested. One does not have to sneak one’s presuppositions into the premises of one’s arguments. Any argument that uses circular reasoning is fallacious, regardless of whether or not the conclusion is true.

His rejection of the law of noncontradiction being universally valid. Though Van Til claimed that he only used the law of noncontradiction for the sake of argument when he shared his faith with nonbelievers, he often criticized many of his colleagues for being inconsistent Calvinists. 39 Though Van Til implied that this law is a man-made principle, he diligently labored to keep his system free from contradictions. Van Til should have realized that there could be no thought or communication whatsoever without the law of contradiction. Even God cannot contradict Himself. And, since God is not subject to anything outside Himself, Clark was right to view this law as naturally flowing from God’s being.

Van Til’s transcendental argument is not the only valid argument for Christianity. Even John Frame, a former student of Van Til, saw problems with Van Til’s transcendental argument. 40 Although Frame recognized the worth of this argument for apologetics, he did not believe it was the only valid argument for Christianity.

First, Frame doubts that the transcendental argument could be persuasive without “the help of subsidiary arguments of a more traditional kind.” 41 Second, Frame thinks Van Til was wrong in his assertion that the traditional arguments proved something less than the God of the Bible. 42 Third, Frame believes that some traditional arguments often work despite the fact that the traditional apologist might wrongly assume that their arguments do not themselves presuppose a Christian world view. 43 Fourth, Frame doubts that the whole of the Christian faith can be established by a single argument which stands alone. 44 Fifth, if Van Til is right in his claim that the apologist must prove the whole biblical doctrine of God rather than just one or a few of His attributes, then the transcendental argument also fails. For the God of the Bible is more than the source of meaning, morality, and rationality. Even the transcendental argument must be supplemented by other arguments. 45 And, sixth, Frame believes that any argument (including the transcendental argument) can be rejected. Hence, further argumentation may be needed to defend the original argument. 46 Therefore, though the transcendental argument of Van Til may be a good argument for the God of the Bible, it is not the only good argument for the God of the Bible. The traditional arguments (cosmological, teleological, moral) for God’s existence may also be used by the apologist.

His rejection of traditional apologetics. Finally, Van Til was wrong to reject traditional apologetics. The Bible commands believers to defend the faith (1 Pt 3:15; Col 4:5-6). The apostles used historical evidences to lead others to Christ (1 Cor 15:3-8). Even Van Til admits that man suppresses the truth that God has given him in nature (Romans 1:18-22). If this is the case, then why shouldn’t apologists use traditional arguments to attempt to dislodge these truths from the nonbelievers’ subconscious mind? As the last chapter showed, traditional apologetics is on much more solid ground than the presuppositional apologetics of either Van Til or Clark would admit.

ENDNOTES

1 Gordon H. Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, 115-142.

2 John M. Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1994), 69-75.

3 Cornelius Van Til, Christian Apologetics (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1976), 43.

4 Ibid., 42.

5 Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1967), 73.

6 Ibid., 34.

7 Ibid., 298.

8 Ibid.

9 Gordon R. Lewis, 128.

10 Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 34, 99-105, 179-180, 195, 197.

11 Ibid., 90.

12 Ibid., 78-79.

13 Ibid., 77.

14 Ibid., 78.

15 Ibid., 92, 94, 231.

16 Ibid., 94.

17 Ibid., 103.

18 Ibid., 94.

19 Ibid., 99-105, 179-180, 195, 197.

20 Ibid., 180.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Gordon R. Lewis, 131.

26 Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 101.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., 299.

30 Ibid., 298.

31 Lewis, 133.

32 Ibid.

33 Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 60, 150, 180, 298.

34 Frame, 69-75.

35 Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 180.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Gordon R. Lewis, 144.

39 Ibid., 146.

40 Frame, 69-75.

41 Ibid., 71.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., 71-72.

44 Ibid., 72.

45 Ibid., 73.

46 Ibid.


May 25 1997

The Problem of Evil

Gabe Ginorio

by Dr. Phil Fernandes
A chapter from his doctoral dissertation
© 1997, Institute of Biblical Defense, All Rights Reserved

One of the greatest obstacles keeping people from accepting Christ is the problem of evil.1 This problem can take several different forms. First, the metaphysical problem of evil asks how evil can exist in a world created by an all-good God.2 Is God the cause of evil, or, is evil itself uncreated and eternal? Maybe evil is not real; it is simply an illusion.3 The metaphysical problem deals with the origin and reality of evil in God’s universe.

Second, the moral problem of evil deals with the evil choices of personal beings.4 This form of the problem argues that since an all-good God would want to destroy evil, and an all-powerful God is able to destroy evil, the existence of evil proves that no all-good, all-powerful God exists.5 The Christian apologist defends the existence of an all-good and all-powerful God. Therefore, he will respond to this argument.

The third form of the problem of evil is called the physical problem of evil.6 The physical problem of evil deals with incidents of natural disasters and innocent human suffering.7 How could God allow evil to occur that is not directly caused by the abuse of human free will?8

The fourth and final form of the problem of evil is not really a philosophical issue. It is the personal problem of evil.9 The personal problem of evil is not a theoretical question about the existence of evil. Instead, it is a personal struggle with a traumatic experience in one’s own life.10 Examples of this would be the sudden and unexpected death of a loved one, a bitter divorce, the loss of a job, or the like. In these situations, the troubled person does not need philosophical answers. What is needed is encouragement, comfort, and biblical counsel.11 Since this form of the problem of evil does not deal with philosophical discussion, it will not be dealt with in this chapter. The remainder of this chapter will deal with the first three forms of the problem of evil.

THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM OF EVIL

The metaphysical problem of evil can be stated as follows: 1) God created everything that exists, 2) evil exists, 3) therefore, God created evil.12 There are several ways people respond to this argument. First, like the Christian Science Cult, some can deny the reality of evil.13 They view evil as an illusion, but this entails a rejection of Christian Theism which clearly accepts the real existence of evil and offers Christ as its solution.14 Therefore, viewing evil as an illusion is not an option for the Christian apologist.

A second possible response to the metaphysical problem is dualism. This is the view that God and evil are coeternal.15 God did not create evil, in this view, since evil is eternal. This view fails in that it makes evil a second ultimate being along with God. God would then no longer be infinite since He and evil would limit each other. However, the cosmological argument has shown that there must be an infinite Being to explain and ground all finite existence. There cannot be two infinite beings, for they would limit each other. If God and evil are both finite, then there would have to be an infinite cause for the existence of both. Dualism would only push the problem of evil further back. It does not offer any ultimate solution to the dilemma. Also, the acceptance of dualism entails a rejection of the existence of the God of the Bible. Therefore, it is not an option for the Christian theist.16

The Christian apologist must defend the reality of evil without proposing evil as eternal or as a creation of God.17 Saint Augustine dealt with this same problem centuries ago. His proposed solution to the metaphysical problem of evil was that all things created by God are good. Nothing in its created nature is evil. Evil, therefore, cannot exist solely on its own. However, evil is real; it does exist. Still, it must exist in something good; it cannot exist on its own. Evil is a privation, a lack or absence of a good that should be there. Evil is a corruption or perversion of God’s good creation. Blindness in a man is evil, for God created man to see. But, blindness in a rock is not evil, for God never meant rocks to have sight. Evil, according to Augustine, is a lack of a good that should be there. Augustine stated, “evil has no positive nature; what we call evil is merely the lack of something that is good.”18

Augustine stated that God did not create evil; He merely created the possibility for evil by giving men and angels free will. When men and angels exercised their free will by disobeying God, they actualized the possibility for evil.19

Thomas Aquinas argued against the metaphysical problem of evil along the same lines as did Augustine.20 This basic response has been the traditional Christian solution to the metaphysical problem of evil. God did not create evil, but, evil exists as a privation or corruption of that which is good. God cannot be blamed for evil. He is only responsible for creating the possibility of evil. When God gave angels and men free will, He created the possibility of evil. Fallen angels and fallen men are responsible for evil through their abuse of free will.21

THE MORAL PROBLEM OF EVIL

The moral problem of evil affirms that an all-good God would want to destroy evil, while an all-powerful God is able to destroy evil. Since evil exists, it is concluded that an all-good, all-powerful God does not exist.22 Some people respond by denying God’s existence (atheism). Others deny that God is all-powerful (finite godism). Rabbi Harold Kushner is an example of the latter. He argues that God is not all-powerful. Kushner declares that mankind needs to forgive God for His failures and help Him to combat evil.23 Obviously, the options of atheism and finite godism are not viable for Christians. Christians must defend both God’s omnipotence (all-powerfulness) and His infinite goodness. Therefore, the moral problem of evil must be answered in another way.

Christian philosophers Geisler and Corduan offer several effective responses to the moral problem of evil. First, there is an unnecessary time limit placed on God.24 The argument against the existence of the theistic God from moral evil assumes that because evil exists God cannot be both all-good and all-powerful. However, what if an all-good and all-powerful God allowed evil for the purpose of a greater good? What if this God is also in the process of destroying evil and will someday complete the process?25 Second, God may have created the possibility of evil for the purpose of a greater good (human and angelic free will). God would not force His love on angels or mankind, for any attempt to force love on another is rape (and not really love at all).26 Therefore, He gave men and angels the freedom to accept or reject His love and His will. Free will necessitates the possibility of evil coming into the universe.27 In fact, human and angelic free choices brought evil and human suffering into the world.

Third, God will use evil for good purposes. If evil did not exist, there could be no courage, for there would be nothing to fear. If evil did not exist, man could only love his friends; he could never learn to love even his enemies. Without evil, there would be no enemies.28 Only an infinite God can know all the good He will bring out of evil (Isaiah 55:8-9).

Fourth, Geisler and Corduan argue that an all-good and all-powerful God is not required to create the best possible world. They reason that all He can be expected to do is create the best possible way to achieve the greatest possible world. Heaven is the greatest possible world.29

Several other points could also be made. First, the atheist usually denies the existence of objective evil since he knows that this would admit to the existence of the absolute moral law.30 The atheist knows that once he acknowledges the absolute moral law, the existence of God (the absolute moral law Giver) surely will follow.31 For evil to be objectively real, it must exist as a perversion of that which is ultimately good. To escape this conclusion, the atheist usually chooses to deny the existence of evil. Therefore, it is rather ironic that the atheist (who usually denies the existence of evil) attempts to use evil to disprove the existence of the God of the Bible. The presence of evil may be problematic for all other world views (including Christian theism), but it is totally devastating to atheism. If there is no God, then there are also no objective moral values. The most consistent atheists, such as Nietzsche, have readily admitted this.32

Second, all world views must deal with the problem of evil, but the God of the Bible is the only guarantee that evil will ultimately be defeated.33 The God of deism is no longer concerned with the problems of this world (such as evil).34 In pantheism, evil is an illusion.35 In atheism, there is no basis to call anything evil.36 But, the biblical God guarantees that evil will be defeated through Christ’s death, resurrection, and return (John 1:29; 1 Peter 2:24; 3:18; Romans 4:25; Isaiah 9:6-7; 11:1-9; Zechariah 9:9-10; Revelation 20;4-6).

Third, non-Christians act as if the existence of evil is an unexpected factor in the Christian world view, but this is not the case. God would not have given mankind the Bible had it not been for the problem of evil. If man had not Fallen in the garden, he would have had no need for salvation (Genesis 3:1-7; Romans 3:10, 23; 5:12; 6:23). The Bible could actually be titled “God’s Solution to the Problem of Evil.”

In short, the solution to the moral problem of evil (how an all-good, all-powerful God can co-exist with evil) is that God gave humans and angels free will. It is the abuse of this free will by humans and angels that has brought evil and human suffering into existence. God created the possibility for evil (by giving man and angels free will), not evil itself.

Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga adds an important detail concerning the Christian response to the moral problem of evil. He writes that there are two ways Christians can respond to this dilemma. First, he may develop a free will theodicy. A theodicy is an attempt to explain what was God’s reason (or reasons) for allowing evil. On the other hand, according to Plantinga, the Christian does not have to go that far. Instead of presenting a free will theodicy, he may develop a free will defense. In this case, rather than attempting to explain the reason as to why God allows evil and human suffering, the Christian can merely suggest a possible reason why God has allowed evil and human suffering.37 The free will defense, according to Plantinga, is sufficient in itself to show that the existence of evil does not rule out the possible existence of the God of theism.38

In other words, since the problem of evil is an attempt to prove God’s existence as being impossible, the Christian only needs to provide possible solutions to this problem. Once this is done, God’s existence will have been shown to be possible. Further argumentation (such as the cosmological, teleological, moral, and ontological arguments) can then be presented to argue for God’s existence with a higher degree of probability.39

THE PHYSICAL PROBLEM OF EVIL

The physical or natural problem of evil deals with evil not directly connected to the abuse of human freedom.40 All physical or natural evil is at least indirectly related to the abuse of human freedom. Without the Fall of man in history, creation would still be perfect (Genesis 1:31). Still, much physical evil is not directly related to human choices. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and deaths of innocent infants are examples of physical evil.

Geisler and Corduan list five explanations for physical evil.41 None of the five are meant to be all-encompassing. Each explains some of the physical evil that occurs. First, some physical evil is necessary for moral perfection.42 There can be no courage without something evil to fear. Misery is needed for there to be sympathy; tribulation is needed for there to be endurance and patience.43 For God to build these characteristics in man, He must permit a certain amount of physical evil.

Second, human free choices do cause some physical evil.44 It would be an obvious error to assume that no physical evil is caused by the abuse of human free will. The choice to drink and drive has caused much physical evil. Many infants have been born with an addiction to cocaine due to their mothers’ choice to abuse drugs while pregnant. It is impossible for God to remove all physical evil without tampering with human free will.45 It is even possible that some major natural disasters are caused by the evil choices of humans. According to the Bible, this was the case with Sodom and Gomorrah (Genesis 18:20-21; 19).

Third, some physical evil is caused by the choices of demons.46 The Scriptures speak of demons (fallen angels led by Satan) causing suffering to humans (Job 1, 2; Mark 5:1-20). Demons oppose God and His plans, but they will ultimately be defeated by Christ (Revelation 19, 20, 21, 22).

Fourth, God often uses physical evil as a moral warning.47 Physical pain is often a warning that greater suffering will follow if behavior is not changed. Examples of this would be excessive coughing that is often caused by smoking and heavy breathing caused by over training during a physical workout. Also, God may use pain and suffering to cause a person to focus on him, rather than on worldly pleasures.48

Fifth, some physical evils are necessary in the present state of the physical world.49 To survive, animals often eat other animals. Humans eat animals as well. It appears that, at least in the present state of the creation, lower life forms are subjected to pain and death in order to facilitate the preservation of higher life forms.50

Physical evil, therefore, does not present any insurmountable problems for Christian theism. Though man is limited in knowledge and cannot infallibly ascertain why God allows each and every case of physical evil, the five reasons given above should suffice to show that the presence of physical evil in no way rules out the existence of the God of the Bible.

CONCLUSION

Once the Christian apologist has provided strong evidence for God’s existence, he need only give possible reasons why an all-good and all-powerful God would allow evil and human suffering. God has good reasons for allowing evil and human suffering, even though we may not know them fully. Therefore, the existence of evil does not disprove the existence of an all-good and all-powerful God. These two are not mutually exclusive.

ENDNOTES

1 Nash, 177.

2 Geisler and Corduan, 318.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 333.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 364.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Nash, 179-180.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., 180.

12 Geisler and Corduan, 318.

13 Mary Baker Eddy, Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures (Boston: The First Church of Christ, Scientist, 1971), 293, 447, 472, 480, 482.

14 Geisler and Corduan, 318-319.

15 Ibid., 319.

16 Ibid., 319-320.

17 Ibid., 318-320.

18 Augustine, City of God, 217, 247, 305, 508.

19 Geisler and Corduan, 323-324.

20 Aquinas, 91-92.

21 Geisler and Corduan, 320-330.

22 Ibid., 333.

23 Kushner, 129,134,145-148.

24 Geisler and Corduan, 334.

25 Ibid., 348.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., 342-343.

30 C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, 34-39.

31 Ibid.

32 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, ed. by Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 228.

33 Geisler and Watkins, 41.

34 Ibid., 148-149.

35 Ibid., 99-100.

36 Ibid., 59.

37 Plantinga, 28.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Geisler and Corduan, 364.

41 Ibid., 372-378.

42 Ibid., 372-373.

43 Ibid., 372.

44 Ibid., 373.

45 Ibid., 373-374.

46 Ibid., 375.

47 Ibid., 376.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid., 376-378.


May 25 1997

Refuting Moral Relativism

Gabe Ginorio

by Dr. Phil Fernandes
A chapter from his doctoral dissertation
© 1997, Institute of Biblical Defense, All Rights Reserved

Philosophical apologetics often deals with the branch of philosophy called ethics. Ethics deals with issues of morality, that which is right and wrong.1 The Christian ethical perspective holds to absolute moral values, laws that are universally binding. Often, non-Christian views hold to moral relativism. Moral relativism rejects the idea that there are objective rights and wrongs.2 What is right for one person is not necessarily right for another person, and vice versa. Each person decides what is right for himself. Many atheists and pantheists are moral relativists.3

AN EXAMINATION OF MORAL RELATIVISM

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) was a German philosopher. He believed that the advances of human knowledge had proven that belief in God was a mere superstition. Nietzsche therefore reasoned that since “God is dead,” all traditional values have died with Him. Nietzsche was angered with his atheistic colleagues who were unwilling to dismiss traditional moral absolutes which had no justification without God’s existence.4

Nietzsche preached that a group of “supermen” must arise with the courage to create their own values through their “will to power.” Nietzsche rejected the “soft” values of Christianity (brotherly love, turning the other cheek, charity, compassion, etc.); he felt they hindered man’s creativity and potential. He recommended that the supermen create their own “hard” values that would allow man to realize his creative potential.5 Nietzsche was very consistent with his atheism. He realized that without God, there are no universal moral values. Man is free to create his own values. It is interesting to note that the Nazis often referred to Nietzsche’s writings for the supposed intellectual justification for their acts of cruelty.6

Many other atheists agree with Nietzsche concerning moral relativism. British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) once wrote, “Outside human desires there is no moral standard.”7 A. J. Ayer believed that moral commands did not result from any objective standard above man. Instead, Ayer stated that moral commands merely express one’s subjective feelings. When one says that murder is wrong, one is merely saying that he or she feels that murder is wrong.8 Jean-Paul Sartre, a French existentialist, believed that there is no objective meaning to life. Therefore, according to Sartre, man must create his own values.9

There are many different ways that moral relativists attempt to determine what action should be taken. Hedonism is probably the most extreme. It declares that whatever brings the most pleasure is right. In other words, if it feels good, do it.10 If this position is true, then there is no basis from which to judge the actions of Adolph Hitler as being evil.11

Utilitarianism teaches that man should attempt to bring about the greatest good for the greatest number of people.12 Utilitarianism is problematic. First, “good” is a meaningless term if moral relativism is true, for then there would be no such thing as good or evil. Second, to say that man “should” do something is to introduce a universal moral command. However, there is no room for universal moral commands in moral relativism.13

Joseph Fletcher founded “situation ethics.” Situation ethics is the view that ethics are relative to the situation. Fletcher claimed that he was not a moral relativist. He believed that there was only one moral absolute: love. Still, his concept of love was so void of meaning that his view of ethics, for all practical purposes, is synonymous with moral relativism.14

The situation never determines what is right. It is God who determines what is right. Still, the situation may aid the Christian in finding which of God’s laws should be applied.15 For when two of God’s commands come in conflict due to a situation so that a person cannot obey both, God requires that the person obey the greater command. God then exempts the person from obeying the lesser command. An example of this is the fact that god compliments Rahab the Harlot for lying in order to save two innocent lives (Joshua 2; Hebrews 11:31; James 2:25).16

REFUTING MORAL RELATIVISM

Moral relativists deny absolute moral law. Still, they, like all people, recognize the evil actions of others when they are wronged. When they are wronged, they appeal to an objective and universal law that stands above man. Moral relativists deny absolute moral law in the lecture hall, but they live by it in their everyday lives.17 Moral relativists reserve the right for themselves to call the actions of Hitler wrong,18 but, if there is no such thing as right and wrong (as the moral relativists say), they cannot really call any action wrong.

The moral law does not ultimately come from within each individual, for then no one could call the actions of another, such as Hitler, evil.19 The moral law does not ultimately come from each society, for then one society could not call the actions of another society (such as Nazi Germany) wrong.20 Finally, the moral law does not ultimately come from world consensus,21 for world consensus is often wrong. World consensus once thought the world was flat. World consensus once considered slavery morally permissible.

Appealing to world or societal consensus as the ultimate source of the moral law is actually just an extension of the view that the individual is the ultimate source. The difference is only quantitative (the number of people increases). However, for there to be a moral law above all men (in order to judge all men), this moral law must be qualitatively above all men. If there is an absolute moral law qualitatively above all men, then there must be an absolute moral law Giver that stands qualitatively above all men. The moral law is not descriptive of what is; it is prescriptive of what should be.22

Since the absolute moral law leads directly to the existence of the theistic God (the absolute moral law Giver), many atheists and pantheists may feel compelled to reject it’s existence. Also, people who wish to live promiscuous lives often choose to reject God’s existence. The apostle John appears to be talking about these people:

And this is the judgment, that the light is come into the world, and men loved the darkness rather than the light; for their deeds were evil. For everyone who does evil hates the light, and does not come to the light, lest his deeds should be exposed (John 3:19-20).

ENDNOTES

1 Geisler and Feinberg, 24-26.

2 Moreland, Scaling the Secular City, 240.

3 Geisler and Watkins, 59, 99-100.

4 Friedrich Nietzsche, 95-96, 143, 228.

5 Ibid., 124-125, 139, 191, 197-198.

6 Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol. 7, 403.

7 Russell, 62.

8 Norman L. Geisler, Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1989), 32.

9 Geisler and Feinberg, 406.

10 Ibid., 400-401.

11 Geisler, Christian Ethics, 36-37.

12 Ibid., 63.

13 Ibid., 73-75.

14 Ibid., 43-61.

15 Geisler and Feinberg, 411.

16 Ibid., 424-427.

17 Hodge, Systematic Theology vol. 1, 210.

18 Hick, The Existence of God, 183-186.

19 Moreland, 246-247.

20 Ibid., 243-244.

21 Geisler and Feinberg, 355.

22 C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, 27-28.


May 25 1997

Postmodernizing Religion

Gabe Ginorio

by Paul Pardi

Religion often has been seen as a necessary balance to the stiff, cold, conclusions given to us by science. Whereas science tells us what the world is, religion tells us what the world means. However, since the enlightenment, religion has, for many, lived in a tension: religious believers are concerned that the object of their faith is “true” yet see the rationalist approach to religion with its deductive proofs for God’s existence and rigid, analytic approach to doctrine as a bane to religious belief and practice. When thinkers like Hume and Kant showed these “proofs” to be inadequate, religion either fell on hard times or survived under the auspices of an irrational activity called faith. The post-Enlightenment period certainly has not been easy on religion but is religious belief destined to be either irrational or irrelevant? Enter postmodernity.

Many philosophers of religion see the adoption of some strain of postmodern thought as a valuable return to the ineffable quality of religion that was lost in the modern period. Releasing God from the shackles of the modernist, logic-chopping philosophy enhances faith and encourages devotion. In this sense some see postmodern thought as a welcome friend to religion. The postmodern epistemology seems to serve as a fine bedfellow for faith in a transcendent being. James Turner in his penetrating *Without God, Without Creed* concludes his historical analysis of the rise of atheism in Western culture with the following insight: “The crucial ingredient, then, in the mix that produced an enduring unbelief . . . boiled down to a decision to deal with modernity by embracing it—to defuse modern threats to the traditional bases of belief by bringing God into line with modernity. Put slightly differently, unbelief emerged because church leaders too often forgot the transcendence essential to any worthwhile God. They committed religion . . . *intellectually* to modes of knowing God fitted only for understanding this world.”

In fact the religious mind has been skeptical for some time of attempts to make God the conclusion of a syllogism or logical proof or scientific discovery. Most conservative believers of any religion would not claim to have come to faith in God by way of some argument. These same believers also, when asked why they believe, would not cite a list of evidences justifying their beliefs. On the face of it, it appears that postmodern epistemology justifies what the religious believer wants to claim: the most important truths are not based upon evidence, reason, and logic but upon experience and community. Thus, under the postmodern epistemology, religion moves out from under the scientistically-bent modernist label “irrational” to the postmodern “non-rational.” For many religious persons, the latter is much better than the former. J. Bottum concludes an article for *First Things* by highlighting a distinct value postmodernity provides to the Catholic apologist, “There is perhaps a use we might make of the postmodern in apologetics, for the collapse of modernity may allow believers to speak once again about God without defensiveness or self-consciousness.”

As with most issues in philosophy, not everyone sees the outlook for the union between postmodern epistemology and religious belief with the same optimism. One immediate question that comes to mind is this: has the postmodern epistemology changed the nature of religious belief or has religious belief always rejected what Alan Padgett calls “linear, scientific thinking” and thus finds the postmodern epistemology a welcome and long-awaited friend? Philosophers of religion now are wrestling with these questions. Interestingly however, this debate doesn’t have two sides but three. There are those who adopt the postmodernist epistemology and see a clear application of that epistemology to religion. As an example of an implementation of this approach, the University of Chicago Press has an intriguing series dealing with postmodernism and religious belief. Their 21 volume collection entitled the *Religion and Postmodernism Series* edited by Mark C. Taylor (who recently released his fourth contribution to the series entitled, *About Religion : Economies of Faith in Virtual Culture*) covers a variety of topics from a somewhat narrow range of authors (including the eminent Derrida himself).

On the other side are those that are highly critical of this union. As might be expected, the criticisms surface not on the marriage itself but on the postmodern epistemology in particular. Of course, it naturally follows that if the postmodern epistemology is vacant, one certainly does not want to marry it to religious belief. *Postmodernism and Christian Philosophy* edited by Roman T. Ciapalo critically examines these very issues. The general consensus of the anthology is that postmodernism is generally a negative influence on Christian thought. Similarly. St. Mary’s College in Twickenham, England will be discussing the viability of the relationship between religion and postmodern epistemology in their conference entitled *Religion and the Cultures of Postmodernity: Quests for Meaning in a Fragmented Age* in June of 2000. On a more popular level, a group called The Crossroads Project is promoting a book by Dennis McCallum entitled *The Death of Truth*. They held a conference with the same title that addressed issues surfaced in the book. McCallum sees postmodernism largely as having a negative influence on culture despite the inadequacies of a pure modernist worldview.

Somewhere in the middle of this debate (and probably most in keeping with the postmodern spirit) are those that see both negatives and positives in the postmodern approach to knowledge and thus in it’s application to religion. The University of Indiana Press has released two back-to-back titles dealing with the subject of postmodern thought and religion in its *Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion*. Merold Westphal (who has done his own share of writing on Kierkegaard and Hegel and serves as General Editor of the series) edited *Postmodern Philosophy and Christian Thought* which deals with the new challenges postmodernity brings to the Christian idea. Similarly *God, the Gift, and Postmodernism*, edited by John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon sympathetically treats the discussion between postmodern theology and the postmodern epistemology putting Derrida and theologian Jean-Luc Marion into dialog.

As I read the introductions to these books and skimmed the chapters, I found that the authors were less concerned with getting a set of “facts” before the mind of the reader and more concerned with constructing images. Communicating factual information, seems to imply rigidity of thought and a one-way, author-to-reader monologue. These authors seem more interested not in telling the readers what to believe as true, but in creating images that are more ideologically fluid and “dialogical.” Still, the books represent a position that holds, for the most part, that postmodern thinkers like Derrida have it right (whatever that might mean) and the project of these volumes is to explore how notions like deconstruction and the “hermeneutics of finitude” might apply to religion.

I asked philosophers Dr. C. Stephen Evans and Dr. Merold Westphal about this movement in philosophy of religion towards postmodernity. I asked Dr. Evans if he saw postmodern philosophy to be a friend or a foe of religious belief. He said, “I am inclined to say both friend and foe. Obviously, it is a friend in unmasking Enlightenment rationalism and its attacks on the rationality of faith. But it is an enemy in undermining respect for objective truth and developing suspicion about ‘metanarratives.’” He sees postmodern philosophy’s biggest aid in that it tears down religious epistemic hubris and opens the door for a more “perspectival” understanding of knowledge given the human condition (which, under the Christian framework, is a state of sinfulness and depravity). On the other hand, “The most damaging aspect is that it can lead to a loss of faith in truth and in the human capacity to know anything, and this in turn leads to a loss of conviction, a pluralistic ‘tolerance’ of everything.” he said. “What we need is an understanding of our finitude and sinfulness that does not despair of the possibility that there is a truth to be known and that we can at least approximate that truth in part.” Evans captures the essence of what many philosophers of religion are trying to do, at least in the West, in evaluating the application of postmodern philosophy to religious systems.

Westphal was a bit more optimistic about postmodernism’s influence on religion. In fact Westphal indicates that postmodernism surfaces a commonality among the major religious systems of the world. He stated, “The great monotheisms, Jewish, Christian, and Islamic, have insisted that God is ultimately unfathomable, ineffable, mysterious, beyond the capacity of created intellects to comprehend. This is a joint reflection on the nature of God as infinite and on the nature of human understanding as finite. Postmodern epistemology is an analysis of the finitude of human understanding on its own terms, without reference to creation or the Creator. But there is an agreement about the inability of human knowledge to grasp totality, infinity, the ultimate.” Westphal affirms that providing this sense of our own epistemic finitude is one of the most auspicious functions of postmodernizing religion. He’s quick to point out, however, that in accepting that finitude, postmodernism may take us too far. “The danger, to which both secular postmodernists and theistic thinkers are sometimes prone, is to assume that if we cannot have everything we cannot have anything, that the only alternative to absolute knowledge, fully adequate (perfect mirror) to its object is cynical nihilism.” Westphal appears to want to caution against this. This is a common *festina lente* that theists tend to apply to the postmodern project vis-à-vis their secular counterparts.

One more important observation needs to be made. One does not have to dig very deeply to see the close affinities postmodern philosophy has with much of Eastern thought, particularly Eastern *religious* thought. Whereas systems like Buddhism and Daoism tend to embrace what appear to the western mind to be contradictions (in the form of, for example, a koan) in an attempt to train the mind to live with contradiction, the postmodern mind isn’t so radical. Postmodernism tends to apply interpretive lenses to contradictions and thus make the contradictions less, well, contradictory. Hegel’s patrimony here is obvious (a fact which makes me think Schaeffer’s observation that modern Christianity’s woes are due primarily to Hegelian thought came three decades too early; Schaeffer may turn out to be more correct than any of his commentators realized). Interestingly there does seem to be some movement on bringing Eastern religious thought and postmodern philosophy together. A paper by Ian W. Mabbett called “Naagaarjuna and Deconstruction” attempts to demonstrate just this. Speaking of Naagaarjuna and Derrida he writes, “Eastward and westward: opposites meet. Perhaps the apostle of the Middle Way and the prophet of infinite deferral have something in common.”

For my own part, being the modernist that I am, I find the notion of a postmodern religion both disturbing and largely incomprehensible. Still, if I were to make a prediction I’d say that a postmodern religious system, like much of Kant’s writings, is just obscure enough that at the end of the day, many philosophers of religion and theologians will find it irresistible.